PDF malware analysis — malicious · a30850a9ac28bd69

MALICIOUS

PDF

55.0 KB Created: 2010-07-06 21:04:53 Authoring application: Virtual PDF Printer - www.go2pdf.com (via Virtual PDF Printer1.01)

MD5: 63958ad3919e1de6bd284ff9f4b52af4 SHA-1: 862a45ba92841b28ffaef125b2b06be8b717ac73 SHA-256: a30850a9ac28bd69adedc0568b6ce9f03a32ccf1cbaca5978066ba6558a31465

446 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 by using a launch action to execute cmd.exe. The command attempts to change the directory to the user's home directory and then execute a payload named 'nou.pdf', which is actually a Windows executable disguised as a PDF. The embedded JavaScript further facilitates this by exporting the embedded executable. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586' confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 13

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: "cmd.exe" critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\nou.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
Launch action high PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action with an unresolved or extension-less target — treat as potentially dangerous
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION

PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
External URI info PDF_URI

PDF contains an external URL action
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.go2pdf.com

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`nou.pdf` `37121ecb7c1e112b735bd21b0dfe3e526352ecb98c434c5f40e6a2a582380cdd`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0x1145	114688 bytes
`javascript_obj0017_000.js` `348c608b3e6a58b89e61f385af4ea50cbf349237ae40165796a02e496f3a3ce8`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 17 at offset 0xD7E9	52 bytes

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