Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e7a4b05c70ed821c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.47 MB Created: 2012-05-10 18:09:54 -03:00 Authoring application: Adobe InDesign CS4 (6.0.5) (via Adobe PDF Library 9.0) First seen: 2026-05-03
MD5: def0c24ecce130c0999c3cdd7eea48e3 SHA-1: f1159e0c89238658337179da16555f0103b3c958 SHA-256: e7a4b05c70ed821c7a8081ff6292c53ebe1267b31f92ea662f69a47a56f5f122
640 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious PDF T1204.001 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, specifically targeting cmd.exe. This action is designed to download and execute an embedded Windows executable payload, masquerading as 'template.pdf'. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The embedded JavaScript is responsible for the download and execution of the second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9836

Heuristics 16

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\template.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators medium PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.startuplessonslearned.com In PDF document text
    • http://www.webholic.com.brIn PDF document text
    • http://www.inovacaoenegocios.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.resultson.com.brIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bizrevolution.com.brIn PDF document text
    • http://www.opulodogato.orgIn PDF document text
    • http://aceleradora.net/blogIn PDF document text
    • http://www.becocomsaida.blog.brIn PDF document text
    • http://www.endeavor.org.brIn PDF document text
    • http://www.tribodomouse.com.brIn PDF document text
    • http://www.saiadolugar.com.brIn PDF document text
    • http://www.brasil20.orgIn PDF document text
    • http://www.startups-brasil.comIn PDF document text
    • http://boo-box.com/anuncieIn PDF document text
    • http://boo-box.com/startups/ptIn PDF document text
    • http://lemon.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.belpesce.com/pt/sobre.phpIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sandbox-network.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ameninadovale.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.zeustech.net/In extracted file (template.pdf)
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (template.pdf)
    • tcp://192.168.0.104:445In extracted file (template.pdf)
    • http://www.typography.comSemiBold/FSTypeIn extracted file (stream_007_off00003e56.bin)
    • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpJMT9cUaP8PDF link annotation
    • http://www.paulgraham.com/articles.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.avc.comIn PDF document text
    • http://sethgodin.typepad.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.mashable.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.gigaom.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.techcrunch.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.venturebeat.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.thenextweb.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.youtube.com/user/maninthearenatvIn PDF document text
    • http://www.youtube.com/user/GeracaodeValorIn PDF document text
    • http://www.youtube.com/user/brasileirosnovaleIn PDF document text
    • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HgzGwKwLmgM&ob=av3eIn PDF document text
    • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smp0nqpovuMIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ooyala.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YD7xn09sdcgIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ted.com/fellowsIn PDF document text
    • http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/br/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In PDF document text
    +8 more URL(s)

Extracted artifacts 12

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
template.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 429 at offset 0x16BF25 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 395496d7f966ad4c931f7863f0151dbb34c63ea4212a7e12428a9a972ea7e822
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=template.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.0.104:445 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0430_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 430 at offset 0x176B72 57 bytes
SHA-256: bc1d5cdfa608238e3cd965aa51949d02f8ab713463ea0beb61ec928b121788d1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_007_off00003e56.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3E56 1110 bytes
SHA-256: 7919d7da6796ed03eb7858b1803af23236a8aaa1199cb00c8aa921fe9f728763
stream_098_off000e903b.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xE903B 2095 bytes
SHA-256: bb72c00c9b4e171f671f9d4f4129d3ea174bfbb7910aa17ef65b4be0951da5c7
stream_106_off000ee795.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xEE795 5032 bytes
SHA-256: bf047859465fbcd25cacbf81eb59248e017c74b5119273d28cb3a9ee0b8f1110
icc_00_off00001e2f.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x1E2F 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_cff_off00002893.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2893 7240 bytes
SHA-256: 286253e0698c301fbbc8d312ebc92a536f4c88d325daba7c6cbbbecdf52dd174
font_03_cff_off000ea26a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xEA26A 4495 bytes
SHA-256: 9c0549a76e0773c5a40a2e31c8f5125fb86fe50afcede6bc58aeb51ca6d21bd7
font_04_cff_off000eb911.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xEB911 6363 bytes
SHA-256: 90669887ebb487d3a089103b4a01855b255349a955aa6604189852630c548826
font_05_cff_off000ed2e6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xED2E6 4331 bytes
SHA-256: 2498d1cea644273cbccda3993fa8c7033d1c57fd2f192fe5a1538ff34a1e1c38
font_07_cff_off000f02f0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xF02F0 2336 bytes
SHA-256: 260d4c38c12d8b10c1c5a83f3d43628331153f49932d9e791ca32e48f1cc6066
font_08_cff_off000f0c93.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xF0C93 535 bytes
SHA-256: f5ce527ad187bc7b12e2961c3d23b289e7fbd8d9e47b3be4760ff5bb8568a818