MALICIOUS
640
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious PDF
T1204.001 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious Link
T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
The PDF contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, specifically targeting cmd.exe. This action is designed to download and execute an embedded Windows executable payload, masquerading as 'template.pdf'. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The embedded JavaScript is responsible for the download and execution of the second-stage payload.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9836
Heuristics 16
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\template.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASIONPDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
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PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators medium PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LUREPDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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External URI info PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.startuplessonslearned.com In PDF document text
- http://www.webholic.com.brIn PDF document text
- http://www.inovacaoenegocios.comIn PDF document text
- http://www.resultson.com.brIn PDF document text
- http://www.bizrevolution.com.brIn PDF document text
- http://www.opulodogato.orgIn PDF document text
- http://aceleradora.net/blogIn PDF document text
- http://www.becocomsaida.blog.brIn PDF document text
- http://www.endeavor.org.brIn PDF document text
- http://www.tribodomouse.com.brIn PDF document text
- http://www.saiadolugar.com.brIn PDF document text
- http://www.brasil20.orgIn PDF document text
- http://www.startups-brasil.comIn PDF document text
- http://boo-box.com/anuncieIn PDF document text
- http://boo-box.com/startups/ptIn PDF document text
- http://lemon.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.belpesce.com/pt/sobre.phpIn PDF document text
- http://www.sandbox-network.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ameninadovale.comIn PDF document text
- http://www.zeustech.net/In extracted file (template.pdf)
- http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (template.pdf)
- tcp://192.168.0.104:445In extracted file (template.pdf)
- http://www.typography.comSemiBold/FSTypeIn extracted file (stream_007_off00003e56.bin)
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpJMT9cUaP8PDF link annotation
- http://www.paulgraham.com/articles.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://www.avc.comIn PDF document text
- http://sethgodin.typepad.comIn PDF document text
- http://www.mashable.comIn PDF document text
- http://www.gigaom.comIn PDF document text
- http://www.techcrunch.comIn PDF document text
- http://www.venturebeat.comIn PDF document text
- http://www.thenextweb.comIn PDF document text
- http://www.youtube.com/user/maninthearenatvIn PDF document text
- http://www.youtube.com/user/GeracaodeValorIn PDF document text
- http://www.youtube.com/user/brasileirosnovaleIn PDF document text
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HgzGwKwLmgM&ob=av3eIn PDF document text
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smp0nqpovuMIn PDF document text
- http://www.ooyala.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YD7xn09sdcgIn PDF document text
- http://www.ted.com/fellowsIn PDF document text
- http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/br/In PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In PDF document text
+8 more URL(s)
Extracted artifacts 12
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
template.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 429 at offset 0x16BF25 | 73802 bytes |
SHA-256: 395496d7f966ad4c931f7863f0151dbb34c63ea4212a7e12428a9a972ea7e822 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=template.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.0.104:445 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
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javascript_obj0430_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 430 at offset 0x176B72 | 57 bytes |
SHA-256: bc1d5cdfa608238e3cd965aa51949d02f8ab713463ea0beb61ec928b121788d1 |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 });
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stream_007_off00003e56.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3E56 | 1110 bytes |
SHA-256: 7919d7da6796ed03eb7858b1803af23236a8aaa1199cb00c8aa921fe9f728763 |
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stream_098_off000e903b.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xE903B | 2095 bytes |
SHA-256: bb72c00c9b4e171f671f9d4f4129d3ea174bfbb7910aa17ef65b4be0951da5c7 |
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stream_106_off000ee795.bin |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xEE795 | 5032 bytes |
SHA-256: bf047859465fbcd25cacbf81eb59248e017c74b5119273d28cb3a9ee0b8f1110 |
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icc_00_off00001e2f.icc |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x1E2F | 3144 bytes |
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e |
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font_00_cff_off00002893.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x2893 | 7240 bytes |
SHA-256: 286253e0698c301fbbc8d312ebc92a536f4c88d325daba7c6cbbbecdf52dd174 |
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font_03_cff_off000ea26a.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xEA26A | 4495 bytes |
SHA-256: 9c0549a76e0773c5a40a2e31c8f5125fb86fe50afcede6bc58aeb51ca6d21bd7 |
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font_04_cff_off000eb911.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xEB911 | 6363 bytes |
SHA-256: 90669887ebb487d3a089103b4a01855b255349a955aa6604189852630c548826 |
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font_05_cff_off000ed2e6.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xED2E6 | 4331 bytes |
SHA-256: 2498d1cea644273cbccda3993fa8c7033d1c57fd2f192fe5a1538ff34a1e1c38 |
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font_07_cff_off000f02f0.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xF02F0 | 2336 bytes |
SHA-256: 260d4c38c12d8b10c1c5a83f3d43628331153f49932d9e791ca32e48f1cc6066 |
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font_08_cff_off000f0c93.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xF0C93 | 535 bytes |
SHA-256: f5ce527ad187bc7b12e2961c3d23b289e7fbd8d9e47b3be4760ff5bb8568a818 |
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