Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 12

• XFA form contains risky executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
  PDF embeds an XFA form whose script block contains exploit, submission/launch, or shell-execution primitives. Ordinary LiveCycle print/update scripts are left as generic XFA/JS signals unless stronger behavior is present.
• Embedded PDF child has suspicious static findings critical PDF_EMBEDDED_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
  PDF contains an embedded PDF stream whose extracted child matches suspicious or malicious PDF heuristics. Wrapper PDFs are commonly used to hide the actual exploit or lure payload from scanners that do not recursively inspect attachments.
• XFA JavaScript heap-spray exploit code critical PDF_XFA_HEAP_SPRAY
  PDF contains XFA script content with heap-spray or shellcode-like JavaScript markers such as large encoded word sequences, util.pack, large arrays, or spray variable names. This is a weaponised Adobe Reader exploit pattern, not a normal interactive form.
• Unusually high stream count medium PDF_MANY_STREAMS
  PDF contains 501+ stream objects — may indicate heap spray or heavy obfuscation
• Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
• JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• XFA form low PDF_XFA
  PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
• AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
  PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://localhost:7001/apply/ProcessForm

  • http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/guidance/45cfr46.htm
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.6/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.1/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
  • http://www.grants.gov/help/download_software.jsp#adobe811
  • http://grants.gov/help/general_faqs.jsp#adobe
  • http://stemcells.nih.gov/research/registry/
  • http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-02-017.html
  • http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a021/a21_2004.html#exc
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.2/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-connection-set/2.4/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-connection-set/2.1/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/data-description/
  • http://apply.grants.gov/system/MetaGrantApplicationWrapper
  • http://apply.grants.gov/system/MetaGrantApplication
  • http://apply.grants.gov/system/Header-V1.0
  • http://apply.grants.gov/system/Global-V1.0
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RRSF424_SF424B-V1.1
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/SF424C-V1.0
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_Budget-V1.1
  • http://apply.grants.gov/system/GlobalLibrary-V2.0
  • http://apply.grants.gov/system/Attachments-V1.0
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_SubawardBudget-V1.2
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_SubawardBudget30-V1.2
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_FedNonFedBudget-V1.1
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_FedNonFed_SubawardBudget-V1.2
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_FedNonFed_SubawardBudget30-V1.2
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_Budget10-V1.1
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_SubawardBudget10_10-V1.2
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_SubawardBudget10_30-V1.2
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_FedNonFedBudget10-V1.1
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_FedNonFed_SubawardBudget10_10-V1.2
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_FedNonFed_SubawardBudget10_30-V1.2
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_PerformanceSite-V1.1
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/PerformanceSite_1_2-V1.2
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/PerformanceSite_1_3-V1.3
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/PerformanceSite_1_4-V1.4
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_KeyPerson-V1.1
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_KeyPersonExpanded-V1.1
  • http://apply.grants.gov/forms/RR_KeyPersonExpanded_1_2-V1.2

  +62 more URL(s)

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