Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 12

• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
  PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
• JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• XFA form low PDF_XFA
  PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
• Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
  Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
• AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
  PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
• PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
  PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.passportcanada.gc.ca

  • http://www.travel.gc.ca
  • http://www.cic.gc.ca
  • http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/update
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
  • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/

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