Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c1ee88dbc041afa0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

587.9 KB Created: ~”oÜÚo7´*Pªì” –=2ÿ*Q{ Authoring application: 6úøçÎ (via {Ê2ŽŽ~JïlØZ¼ÍuTg¹dN9áÂô)
MD5: edd50a455353b0720288105bce835d93 SHA-1: 1a32461110e84e11c88f6b0375c51a5d9cc1b2ac SHA-256: c1ee88dbc041afa0d1a6e2ee3d42eb6cec22a40d8113e9bde578be37caf42ddf
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. It contains encrypted content and embedded JavaScript, which is a common technique to hide malicious payloads from static analysis. The presence of PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS and PDF_JS heuristics strongly suggests that the JavaScript is used to decrypt and execute the hidden malicious content. The document body is unreadable, preventing a more specific analysis of the lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.8763

Heuristics 9

  • Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS
    PDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
    Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.

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