Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b01504923cb17ae8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

234.0 KB Created: 2021-09-06 22:32:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2021-09-17
MD5: d5c06ca6c07c50b0da65d3b61a5190ad SHA-1: 9c9fa6e8706707300dc705768bbad10ec28ab908 SHA-256: b01504923cb17ae83b1fc1f1d97053ec1f4f10c4c3815ef4be21046fd7c7ce14
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object, identified as a macro-enabled Excel worksheet, contains a VBA macro project. The macro project is associated with the URL https://www.bitly.com/jasdojasdokkakasdasasddasjsd, indicating it likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload. The presence of an embedded macro points to a T1059.005 (Visual Basic) technique.

Heuristics 4

  • Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
    This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • https://www.bitly.com/jasdojasdokkakasdasasddasjsdIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet3.xlsm 20285 bytes
SHA-256: c826a4802da3ab2e283f594a379906d628b05bc75403de7aa703078ede6ecb00