Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6b7f36519cdc4a69…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

197.9 KB Created: 2022-05-22 17:36:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2022-05-24
MD5: b47cd017fd14d713eafca5df78fdd4d9 SHA-1: d2983010f1f3ae69782486b774fe536fb0540498 SHA-256: 6b7f36519cdc4a69ebc2e6986331da18741bdb3eaf1f6dc4bd7e8acc3db77382
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object that carries a VBA macro. This macro is designed to download a second-stage payload from the URL https://www.mediafire.com/file/2a7yyf6hvza3neh/4.htm/file. The presence of the embedded macro and the external download URL strongly indicate a phishing attempt via attachment, leading to further malicious activity.

Heuristics 3

  • Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
    This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.mediafire.com/file/2a7yyf6hvza3neh/4.htm/file
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
5ef1659ab66f099f5bd36fcc90d0711aa84402294753cf5c8bef02ec18f40da5
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/!!!~!!~~!!!!3.!!!~!!~~~~!~!!~~!!!! 14374 bytes