Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 033afd7d4e6a9da6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

332.4 KB Created: 2021-09-06 23:09:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2021-09-22
MD5: 0cc39dcbf5c260ebc5dd980ed21379ee SHA-1: f2c5f28f5e15677e662ae3214bc5181eeafef7a9 SHA-256: 033afd7d4e6a9da60d9ee098d045b1735bdc765142707fc1d8e6ccbf1739f252
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object, which in turn contains a VBA macro. This macro is associated with a suspicious URL, indicating it likely functions as a downloader for a second-stage payload. The embedded macro is the primary indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
    This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • https://www.bitly.com/jaijijijsdojaasaddakaasksdsdIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/Microsoft_Office_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet2.xlsm 20293 bytes
SHA-256: a5646ed44046cf717d2a6152fd8ee66c2bb0213d7dc9066777dcc6bdb5502c35

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