Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 a38a1cad143ad77f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.1 KB First seen: 2026-05-04
MD5: d47e34400757f7dc242619cd08af813f SHA-1: b04345b70d4a6de27a0a3e946a2c3c411e2fa861 SHA-256: a38a1cad143ad77f4fa57178889081316a5283a79946af0fd5d595a73575d159
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the exportDataObject function to launch an embedded executable disguised as 'template.pdf'. This executable is detected as a Metasploit stager and a Windows Trojan. The PDF also contains a launch action for cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands on the victim's system. The embedded executable and the launch action point towards exploitation of a PDF reader vulnerability to achieve code execution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\template.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (template.pdf)
    • tcp://111.122.133.144:443In extracted file (template.pdf)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
template.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x3B5 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 7b9ed7c9d041ca78227ba910c15df70eb5e103ecb9ac82e9751d1abd942d6c1c
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=template.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 111.122.133.144:443 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0009_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xAFA5 57 bytes
SHA-256: bc1d5cdfa608238e3cd965aa51949d02f8ab713463ea0beb61ec928b121788d1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 });

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.