Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e627a63faf73d5fc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.1 KB First seen: 2026-05-03
MD5: 08833275cede126a571ce2ab8d2b746c SHA-1: 5c18f9b5531ba76ac45a4a48bae5790b08925fbd SHA-256: e627a63faf73d5fc2f63851c26e3e53c45743083c8c2c5ccece1dae4318fec53
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1187 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a critical heuristic firing for PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND indicates that cmd.exe is executed with specific parameters. Furthermore, a critical heuristic for PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD confirms that a Windows executable is embedded within the PDF. The embedded executable is masquerading as a PDF file named 'template.pdf' but is detected by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7'. The overall attack pattern involves exploiting a PDF vulnerability (CVE_2010_1240) to launch a command shell that then executes the embedded malicious payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\template.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (template.pdf)
    • tcp://179.213.164.154:4444In extracted file (template.pdf)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
template.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x3B5 73802 bytes
SHA-256: ae7f0c97a4047f3b91420acfa510235137ed7ee4342665bc0d28a33b119077d8
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=template.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 179.213.164.154:4444 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0009_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0xAFB4 57 bytes
SHA-256: bc1d5cdfa608238e3cd965aa51949d02f8ab713463ea0beb61ec928b121788d1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 });