Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 69b990f961b6156a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.03 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-05-18
MD5: dbdd32adff9110e61582d14156ef874b SHA-1: 1455b29689ad7529278025eb4d5ee4305ac05ef4 SHA-256: 69b990f961b6156a0d7818fefc60254795a7bce95fd9269b4ff498160fa0d5e6
108 Risk Score

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements info OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00000549.icc)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
SHA-256: 7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD024B324F/Ole10Native 1039344 bytes
SHA-256: 19031ae7e94adf1378e9eabbe1b7e40c8ae816e7fdc164801c1ae78a9b0f0b3c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.74, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ole10native_00_Soseal.pdf ole-package-payload OLE Ole10Native payload: MBD024B324F/Ole10Native; display_name=Soseal.pdf; full_path=C:\Users\91974\AppData\Local\Temp\Soseal.pdf; temp_path=; def_file= 1038927 bytes
SHA-256: 4f2a691c6e16ca7ac4b53ec7ab574b72ec12ba6e80704c58c3c6d8dd2bd199ba
icc_00_off00000549.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x549 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 3f6d674174f3804eb0dabdac90ae17486e898c5063a66f861c116ea033da8301
polyglot_child_pdf_off00002695.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x2695 1073003 bytes
SHA-256: 2269e19406b9118adbf85e2ffb83b15985b1f624aac0e9c56852a826dbd1d35c

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.