Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5095ba944aa9b86b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

931.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-05-19
MD5: 1784954d9a2a21783862760b512ac096 SHA-1: ce274cb7a7a7f42851980ca8a1d504377e00b9fa SHA-256: 5095ba944aa9b86b1c1d392a8dbd69529516da5182d28da3b7fbdfb50fcd6e62
108 Risk Score

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements info OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://0000000000000000000000000000=ႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭ@0010217725121 In document text (OLE body)
    • http://0000000000000000000000000000=ႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭႭ@66.63.170.81Decoded from obfuscated IP host (0010217725121)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00000545.icc)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
SHA-256: 7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD022E8C84/Ole10Native 910492 bytes
SHA-256: 138e7ccc3896e8b3cb0f49ebe129820661eed599eb830f18eade2955224b21d4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.85, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ole10native_00_PI._K25E024_to_Francis_Cobenzane_9.8.pdf ole-package-payload OLE Ole10Native payload: MBD022E8C84/Ole10Native; display_name=PI. K25E024 to Francis Cobenzane 9.8.pdf; full_path=C:\Users\91974\AppData\Local\Temp\PI. K25E024 to Francis Cobenzane 9.8.pdf; temp_path=; def_file= 909805 bytes
SHA-256: e8837dcd86001d6a0fa9bb200494e1ea97eba2e12debc1d44cedfd21edf81ad6
icc_00_off00000545.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x545 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 3f6d674174f3804eb0dabdac90ae17486e898c5063a66f861c116ea033da8301
polyglot_child_pdf_off000024ef.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x24EF 944401 bytes
SHA-256: 477cf42163a94e12cd67ad7b847dcf607b7899ad51bc15d630988def59b0ed51

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