Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 17cfadccea3bf769…

MALICIOUS

PDF

116.2 KB Created: 2005-09-06 14:52:49 UTC Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 5.0 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 5.0.5 (Windows))
MD5: 5bc0a897cedb73f9daddc307c647333a SHA-1: 66368aee9e22bba521d08eb99d79c36290da4713 SHA-256: 17cfadccea3bf769199180a24cfe17600a9a775ea2e22a08e6bcdea239239c84
558 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function to launch `cmd.exe`. This command then executes a dropped Windows executable, masquerading as 'nq_press.pdf'. This chain of execution is indicative of a downloader or dropper, leveraging CVE-2010-1240 for initial execution and embedding a PE payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\nq_press.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-13464 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-13464
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.netquote.com/
    • http://www.spectrumequity.com/
    • http://www.stripesgroup.com/
    • http://www.ticc.com/
    • http://www.netquote.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
nq_press.pdf
0ba83cc608401e006168423e191b15a004827ee02fd0028c1d6d835409583e4e		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 103 at offset 0x17E4E 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0104_000.js
780b75343f80962a3cf9c724b46d7e74ee33152235e494992050b576318c77c9		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 104 at offset 0x1CB43 57 bytes
icc_00_off00013bcc.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x13BCC 3144 bytes

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