Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 17cfadccea3bf769…

MALICIOUS

PDF

116.2 KB Created: 2005-09-06 14:52:49 UTC Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 5.0 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 5.0.5 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 5bc0a897cedb73f9daddc307c647333a SHA-1: 66368aee9e22bba521d08eb99d79c36290da4713 SHA-256: 17cfadccea3bf769199180a24cfe17600a9a775ea2e22a08e6bcdea239239c84
618 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, specifically targeting CVE-2010-1240. The script attempts to export a data object named 'nq_press.pdf' which is actually a Windows executable payload. The launch action then executes 'cmd.exe' to potentially run the embedded executable, indicating a dropper or exploit delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-13464 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-13464
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\nq_press.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.netquote.com/ PDF link annotation
    • http://www.spectrumequity.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.stripesgroup.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ticc.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.netquote.comPDF link annotation
    • tcp://24.89.174.187:20In extracted file (nq_press.pdf)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00013bcc.icc)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
nq_press.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 103 at offset 0x17E4E 37888 bytes
SHA-256: 0ba83cc608401e006168423e191b15a004827ee02fd0028c1d6d835409583e4e
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=nq_press.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 24.89.174.187:20 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0104_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 104 at offset 0x1CB43 57 bytes
SHA-256: 780b75343f80962a3cf9c724b46d7e74ee33152235e494992050b576318c77c9
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "nq_press", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off00013bcc.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x13BCC 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off00001a90.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A90 39656 bytes
SHA-256: 53bba111b2f0a2fddecd19fee3b36586542542ea271e00661a64ae5ef0fb310c
font_01_sfnt_off00006f9e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F9E 22188 bytes
SHA-256: c3754e4f7d62f5823fa870204220e298b1b1846c3b65b75f7c2123a8a8ed7670
font_02_sfnt_off0000a174.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA174 62616 bytes
SHA-256: 0b33cd39e766b2bf95630e1809a8663c1f666893a8e97c71e7b00ca0bd7e2173

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