Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2b14c51a7a8f44ff…

MALICIOUS

PDF

487.2 KB Created: 2010-07-20 14:11:25 Authoring application: ComponentOne C1Report First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: d212710b38e42699b983ff25879abaf2 SHA-1: 87d438856c04f629fe9422d09a23663660512fb7 SHA-256: 2b14c51a7a8f44ff1bff84add457808f7fda7700a1bfddcebf50155e21ca261b
638 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file contains a JavaScript action that triggers a launch action, ultimately executing cmd.exe. The primary payload is an embedded Windows executable, masquerading as 'ephone_ibm.pdf', which was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0. The PDF itself was also flagged by ClamAV as Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586. The combination of PDF launch actions, embedded executable payloads, and JavaScript dropper APIs strongly indicates a malicious intent to deliver and execute a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9983

Heuristics 15

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\ephone_ibm.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Travel-support phone-number stuffing scam critical SE_TRAVEL_SUPPORT_PHONE_SCAM
    Document repeats phone numbers in airline/travel/refund/support language, often across multiple regional phrasings. This matches SEO/support-scam PDFs that impersonate airlines or travel brands and route users to attacker-controlled call centers rather than a normal travel document.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/classes/insufficient_session_expiration.shtml PDF link annotation
    • http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/classes/information_leakage.shtmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.webappsec.org/projects/threat/classes/abuse_of_functionality.shtmlIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/PersonalDirectory/pdContactImport.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/personaldirectory/pdContactImport.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ephonebook/PersonalDirectory/pdContactImport.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/admin/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbIn PDF document text
    • http://10.10.50.45/ephonebook/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/cfide/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ephonebook/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/Logout.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/personaldirectory/personaldirectory_contaIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ephonebookIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ephonebook/Logout.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/www/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/CorporateDirectory/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/default.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/CorporateDirectory/CorporateDirectory_ContactIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/CorporateDirectory/CorporateIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/CorporateDirectory/CorporateDirectory_ConIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/CorporateDirectory/cdPagerOutput.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/CorporateDirectory/cdPagerOIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/CorporateDirectory/corporatedirectory_contact.aIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/CorporateDirectory/corporateIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/CorporateDirectory/corporatedirectory_contIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/PersonalDirectory/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/PersonalDirectory/PersonalDirectory_Contact.asIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/PersonalDirectory/PersonalDirIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/PersonalDirectory/PersonalDirectory_ContaIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/PersonalDirectory/pdContactIIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/PersonalDirectory/pdPagerOutput.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/PersonalDirectory/pdPagerOuIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/corporatedirectory/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/corporatedirectory/cdPagerOutput.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/corporatedirectory/cdPagerOuIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/corporatedirectory/corporatedirectory_conIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/corporatedirectory/corporatedirectory_contact.aIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/corporatedirectory/corporatediIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/corporatedirectory/corporatedirectory_contaIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/personaldirectory/In PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/personaldirectory/pdContactIIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/personaldirectory/pdPagerOutput.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/personaldirectory/pdPagerOutIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/personaldirectory/personaldirectory_contact.aspIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/personaldirectory/personaldireIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ePhoneBook/personaldirectory/personaldirectory_contactIn PDF document text
    • http://devintr01.compassbnk.com/ephonebook/CorporateDirectory/In PDF document text
    +97 more URL(s)

Related samples 2

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 9

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ephone_ibm.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 242 at offset 0x6EBD4 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 67b5cf5507ae6470b817a8a06d78b6ef5b26fcbe336c8ad3a6553241a78a63c5
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=ephone_ibm.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0243_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 243 at offset 0x798E5 59 bytes
SHA-256: fb7cb0d7492df9b789b3da6827e35699873c7b1cada62fbefc8adbe7b636b6a3
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "ephone_ibm", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_094_off000531ff.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x531FF 66864 bytes
SHA-256: 7e77532bc85abd7ec8eaa448c00f1538597a45b02bd92e08a4df2a58d3addee1
font_00_sfnt_off00047932.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x47932 53904 bytes
SHA-256: 4435e6cef226f21ee3a7e6646cb123530d2274959f1fd60e561068b4a9bb320f
font_01_sfnt_off0004e042.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4E042 45284 bytes
SHA-256: 012571fb32e893ab3d3e08eb7ecda249d6a09e8600c8134282a88fbd6f7f94e6
font_03_sfnt_off0005baf4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5BAF4 36468 bytes
SHA-256: 0c58705776cf91771e7050f57b979a528eaeab07a04d6a919558d7d7a97d6ece
font_04_sfnt_off0005f50f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F50F 35348 bytes
SHA-256: db44bc6e456dd927d38987cfc59f8b1857e2c31f49cf2528078443d7598abf81
font_05_sfnt_off00062323.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x62323 17472 bytes
SHA-256: e491ad54116a186ac68c6292dff26820af945ecfed8d8277249eee4a70323871
font_06_sfnt_off0006541b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6541B 7620 bytes
SHA-256: 610eb3ca73813efb50db5ed09cbe4ce011cc851a9af837391868b438d098fd27

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