Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 35a2e99337d7efcb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.19 MB Created: 2008-02-02 04:32:41 +00:00 Authoring application: htmldoc 1.8.27 Copyright 1997-2006 Easy Software Products, All Rights Reserved.
MD5: 7354cfc2e7021c667f3a4d82cde5cd86 SHA-1: fb30f468063febd971feb82bcc319eb52ef532b0 SHA-256: 35a2e99337d7efcbd0b7cdd6449484e7f4a8c6eb700b89109e72a55d9f7490cc
466 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that targets cmd.exe, indicating an attempt to execute a payload. The critical heuristic PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD confirms an embedded Windows executable, disguised as 'NA.pdf'. This executable is likely the second-stage payload. The CVE_2010_1240 heuristic further supports the exploitation of a launch action vulnerability. The embedded JavaScript and launch action work together to drop and execute the payload.

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\NA.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.easysw.com/htmldoc/
    • http://www.easysw.com/
    • http://www.fltk.org
    • http://www.easysw.com/newsgroups.php
    • http://www.openssl.org/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
NA.pdf
9bf2b4cb76a5efe812c8aa79963f418ee0dfc8f38ba2b9a72d0d4667f32e74da		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 1460 at offset 0x124A61 73802 bytes
javascript_obj1461_000.js
be79bcfd0f6a9426a3f8d1864f074d9ba7edb0d61c9d7362b4d79b101c40e904		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1461 at offset 0x12F70C 51 bytes

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