Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ff953ac51e2d9d06…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.0 KB Created: 2020-07-10 06:55:26 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-25
MD5: 19cdfe948895f0f965647306b69a00a8 SHA-1: 181a2ce31df28b1fe84e491575e1f9053e994114 SHA-256: ff953ac51e2d9d0659bc08709df32593cdfad81fe990236cc4a606321823ee81
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a mass external link farm, with numerous URLs pointing to various file-hosting domains. One of the embedded links, https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=pdfbox%202.0.8%20maven, is identified as a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=pdfbox%202.0.8%20maven In PDF document text
    • http://files.ttphotovideo.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130774990/1089514.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.adwinusa.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775965/1880839.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jovonmiller.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606533/5405179.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.goodlooksbeautysupply.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131859895/9841417.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.humantraffickingpgh.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070612/tofivi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.byzantineegypt.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813965/8670015.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.bigtrecreation.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379612/fasezojozixuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.shekhongchoi.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740439/tironar_luruvo_wuzobo_vixadegizuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.legallyours.org/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871533/e87cdc3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.whitneydavisliterary.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813714/6158397.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://jupeveni.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vativukabowi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mawefewo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/56104246822.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xugipoxuwigo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/9244819272.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/81397135942.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/kefemomorevogik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/kaxoku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005d54.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D54 5176 bytes
SHA-256: 6064b062fc2d25d288356adb8c9da2513b17fb1653da377eea1e01e4a90f19b7
font_01_sfnt_off00006edb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6EDB 12772 bytes
SHA-256: 9cac2f2d64f763a6debe3e06a60357f0763bba27f73c66aa457f221e4128ddb6

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