Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4475a665e0aae0e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.5 KB Created: 2020-07-10 18:58:22 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-10
MD5: e7dbf1b6efe2275c04dc7bc1547bd3cb SHA-1: 1f879ef4d4278325316b3b3e8a7c12389d9d38fe SHA-256: d4475a665e0aae0efb48d49d82e8f1c5b5689314b04580ec429c1c5b78029b43
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

This PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to a link farm designed for SEO manipulation. One critical heuristic identified a link to a known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, while containing garbled text, includes the same deceptive 'types of organizational charts pdf' lure and the malicious URLs, indicating the primary intent is to drive users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=types%20of%20organizational%20charts%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.thecherigroves.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398156/0c09cff1c7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.smsdblueeagle.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071056/616651a45dddf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.stevensprickschuster.net/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969140/tukinulixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jovonmiller.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606533/5405179.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lorraine-lopez.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437319/xalalos-pudugomukor-lanokaxejiwa-togugu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.hypnobabiescoloradosprings.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437225/genezadulapi_zowoxafi_sudev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.southcoastguttermonkeys.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163561/mukidegetum-nogipi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.riccijustisart.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453855/8196007.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.vomhiddencreek.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606127/kukuko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://bawizevil.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/pikexezopativixipelom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bavewugu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nisinofasaxorokomimov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lesusitaku.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/49165400386.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jeraneb.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/5109424996.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sulupovabas.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/98544000542.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sagakav.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/12811482887.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://soluwefuxuxu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/76054619431.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/fofigez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/munununexarusod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/7664/9124/files/91972745871.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/1312/8867/files/80487087019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006855.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6855 5308 bytes
SHA-256: bc0447cd2397c72656da1ff5e4d69de290502dfceca1f5e42a2859880c1eb7a3
font_01_sfnt_off00007a6a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7A6A 10116 bytes
SHA-256: aee5caf0aa2cf255d0ec3a3e04c802ecf3601c5654a9d1b3df0c280c6c30eb1b