Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 f17a801f5a623a41…

MALICIOUS

PDF

106.4 KB Created: 2020-07-08 16:56:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: f0dafe1b3d59c8df7081288c648bb917 SHA-1: 7ab9323382d6127809279711463a4abc6e5e8f71 SHA-256: f17a801f5a623a410ed035da2ea676ebcbe72b3e190ca9b7a6ddcd9a4a77d194
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document exhibits characteristics of a link farm, with numerous embedded URLs pointing to external PDF files. One critical heuristic identified a link to a known malicious redirector infrastructure, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body contains garbled text and a URL that appears to be part of the SEO poisoning lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=manual%20de%20formulas%20para%20excel%202010%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.heavencanbefound.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384018/tizalunovemili.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.centrocha.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873870/7918256.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.bristolfertilitysupportgroup.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163563/742060.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.barrons-conferences.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409170/3066792.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.unitedconceptsllc.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130815095/fapojiridej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.kperrou-ontax.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740573/1129426.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.chipsiunc.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739744/kivirebavaf_foxawerutelizu_rujoleki_modedemifuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.heatherseagraves.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302774/nufigidoruz-reverime-mojavo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://muzinag.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/mogezavela.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pinejal971108352.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/23157072582.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zupolixaleka.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/20592320138.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pulanaradi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nobavunizuli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xepunaket.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/59405128918.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vajozix.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/62064669562.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dudixefusef.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/jisodovilugeloduk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/20424522606.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/kepudanunakadop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/75609531209.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00016596.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16596 5456 bytes
SHA-256: 0a7457a23573831472da66b408d155750620663437c98286b61ece23d07ec384
font_01_sfnt_off00017811.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x17811 10812 bytes
SHA-256: 04be7ff887725dd906304afd77373519f7a14e0e1257aecd5702beb8d265eee7

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.