Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 743241e484f438e4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.5 KB Created: 2020-07-09 15:36:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: b4058180278e723c79d506714439f329 SHA-1: 7e01450d1f2a722596479c46bf79ac2f270e48a8 SHA-256: 743241e484f438e4dd0fb761f1f360975f3563872fa0b75c8c1b0598eed9fe1a
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a malicious redirector link disguised as a search result, which leads to a large collection of other PDFs hosted on disposable domains. This pattern is indicative of a link farm used to distribute malware or facilitate phishing. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=how%20to%20convert%20word%20file%20to%20pdf%20windows%2010
    • http://files.sathiavanee-veeramoothoo.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871891/jidutemepupaz.pdf
    • http://files.catholic-teaching-alliance.org/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070289/zuvikapinibume.pdf
    • http://files.heavencanbefound.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384018/tizalunovemili.pdf
    • http://files.erinboake.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776718/maxul_zefanenumu_ruxuxotevar_jazomagudigem.pdf
    • http://files.lindalgraham.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455283/7d86161771d526.pdf
    • http://files.sunnyleeras.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776775/83d9ce11.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://zelejalum.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/lonamava.pdf
    • https://loxisimumo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/kukofiliziragodukibebi.pdf
    • https://patibubu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/5299518459.pdf
    • https://balijekojef733686966.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/webipolotunetolawirelaf.pdf
    • https://guzisaka.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/81926983885.pdf
    • https://metazak.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/80590300025.pdf
    • https://fumeperotozu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/10304763319.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/bekikelazipilexujewa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/pujofupokutesigitugut.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/fokukivovasogu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/5137558887.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/99914628395.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006976.bin
d74b98b4f7799b194eed1de01e52608c1c8036dc9d10552c0ffb318b8ef1497d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6976 5032 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007ab9.bin
aaadb19a6a14160f23ea13cf496a0dbfbbaa67250910519d0d5761d50c6b25cc		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7AB9 10052 bytes

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