Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 efe12646375ef0c1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.6 KB Created: 2020-07-09 12:59:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: 103ea4c2a5c342cd946c6146a8a614a8 SHA-1: 28ac7e8cb5ac6ce3d288d84b028909e641335719 SHA-256: efe12646375ef0c14c110d86fd20d73d81616891579493c8d028a8a002bfaf47
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, including one pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body text and embedded links suggest a lure to download further malicious content, potentially related to 'curriculum development studies'. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=curriculum%20development%20studies%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.maritzavives.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815346/zotowelew_lotavapibo_zevubebesoden_sodagufeje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.rainiersoundsystems.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070526/mazasanusekejewusibu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.dizzycoach.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874129/redesoba-xurun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.rabbicallie.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438523/7009751.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.chsrocketsbaseball.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637255/9ba0cfc2498e26.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.artlynchactingcoach.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380868/tagaxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.negsbestthing.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815961/riwemuto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.northwestuu.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406433/zugugipa-jitezakuginupe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://newomigefixe.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/95383170611.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wapenowov.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/wopisukewirewomofavirudok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xezerak.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/padoxupunikesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fefenojedef.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/kilopanawipaperax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wozokaju.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/visedidozagalano.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/50751207741.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/xubeke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/49605194079.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/jazaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/72645751706.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/65107231385.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006499.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6499 5056 bytes
SHA-256: 20a2032f3563f225b5974879db74622a07f207a4a44a91510cabe10c2314a0b8
font_01_sfnt_off000075b7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x75B7 10396 bytes
SHA-256: fb7dcbeb9d9b748444c5d8a37304459c680801f7095c609afac1edf133ecea9d

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