Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b46dd5e8e21219d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.8 KB Created: 2020-07-10 17:31:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: bcea40efc63992a3b935d323e12aa40f SHA-1: 2a9fe73d945971068e48ad48e02030d3c5b30084 SHA-256: 7b46dd5e8e21219d721f47ed6995e2c725bf694a718dca26983e98c0df28280a
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable domains and redirect to malicious infrastructure. The primary redirector URL is identified as malicious. The document body, though obfuscated, contains the same URLs, suggesting a link farm designed to lead users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=el%20modernismo%20en%20la%20literatura%20espa%C3%B1ola%20pdf
    • http://files.napsautosales.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483662/kiridijuw.pdf
    • http://files.chsrocketsbaseball.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637255/9ba0cfc2498e26.pdf
    • http://files.thechelseaclaire.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776164/2852045.pdf
    • http://files.pacehighchoir.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871891/2056809.pdf
    • http://files.ethelbustamante.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406356/7012749.pdf
    • http://files.omanroadshow.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776841/kasulojemuv.pdf
    • http://files.jennacole.org/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071209/titofez.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://kogovabazoro.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/9493545281.pdf
    • https://wutefunog608305438.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/5028412452.pdf
    • https://zikobuvadi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/dupajiwalog.pdf
    • https://jikekivadu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/pabidutuf.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3526/3138/files/vefuder.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6749/7880/files/85366655558.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4296/3613/files/20979753245.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000608f.bin
4f9f526f5034328cc3beec328bc119276914c75aadcbc23ac552be2b0f042969
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x608F 5240 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000071ff.bin
888f83ec7eb1ad578c4ab53729050150e9d89b3fa8d53d5166e8e310434b460a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x71FF 9964 bytes