Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e8179ead0be0a792…

MALICIOUS

PDF

250.3 KB Created: 2010-06-29 10:30:35 +08:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 8.0 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 8.0.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 41210896ce7fe7fb0649d64c10b29a9c SHA-1: 806b318304556ee6c7e4ffc2592cede0cc72bf8a SHA-256: e8179ead0be0a792b8564a31a089591540fa024d91bdc231ae7bd7f84d365520
458 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a RichMedia (Flash) object, indicating an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities. Specifically, the CVE-2009-4324 heuristic firing points to the use of the media.newPlayer API to trigger an exploit. The presence of an embedded secondary PDF and obfuscated JavaScript further supports this. The attack pattern is likely to leverage this exploit to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9398

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Flash ActionScript-3 exploit loader in PDF critical CVE related PDF_FLASH_AS3_EXPLOIT_LOADER
    An embedded Flash (SWF) object's ActionScript-3 bytecode contains exploit-loader primitives: decompressing an inner SWF into a ByteArray and executing it via LoaderContext.allowLoadBytesCodeExecution, and/or Vector heap/JIT spray groomers. Benign Flash content does not load and execute code from raw bytes — this is a staged Flash exploit delivered through the document.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
     var nop =  unescape("\x25\x750c0c");
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_002_off00000392.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x392 4264 bytes
SHA-256: 4a5557f55eb12df6d6fef2d325b6e506a36073ef09475e823f5790ab0797bf42
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 3 long base64-like blob(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long hex-escaped blob(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js string-concatenation normalized Acrobat API aliases at offset 0x392 126 bytes
SHA-256: 42c3f4df375ff6f58ff655cc4f88b5cc28f0dd33b978390db3538684a6219b74
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
media.newPlayer(null); /* AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA */
objstm_0017_00.bin pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 17 0 obj (inflated) 871 bytes
SHA-256: dd7918c182d6e2b8d996a6b8ee81663c49a0cb297efe1e1fa3c5af0c987bde84
icc_00_off0002db72.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2DB72 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off00028ed0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x28ED0 167032 bytes
SHA-256: 0e0517f6b1057ff2c505822f00109a0b51bb3a23d2be2444217a93527d0e9b03
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001f097.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x1F097 129178 bytes
SHA-256: 5565eaaba69b8d04f799478fd3ab326fa6a7212f64cd4ac65b53fa0e18959584
polyglot_child_pdf_off0003d144.pdf polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x3D144 6125 bytes
SHA-256: 0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8