Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d55d09efe95efa10…

MALICIOUS

PDF

58.7 KB Created: 2009-08-30 00:20:17 UTC Authoring application: AdobePS5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Mac OS X 10.5.8 Quartz PDFContext) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 1f6ddb0acf150924cb5bddfde7cdb26c SHA-1: e5dfcdbf0aff7c6916aba5253b1777ceb87b0327 SHA-256: d55d09efe95efa1094e051dd3805c84af160e01c89b3b62117a9edc40cb20c68
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the exportDataObject function to launch cmd.exe. This executable is then instructed to execute a file named 'form.pdf', which has been identified as a Windows executable payload. The embedded URLs, particularly http://www.zeustech.net/, suggest a potential command and control channel or download source for the payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader Launch/export embedded executable chain critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1240_EMBEDDED_PE_EXPORT
    PDF combines a /Launch action with an embedded-file name tree, exportDataObject JavaScript, and embedded executable bytes. This matches the CVE-2010-1240 Launch-file abuse chain even when the Launch dictionary does not expose the stricter cmd.exe /Win shape.
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (form.pdf)
    • tcp://192.168.205.98:443In extracted file (form.pdf)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off000005b1.icc)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
form.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 19 at offset 0x3ACF 73802 bytes
SHA-256: c40da68442a72848b62dffc341cb67fafc49d3ca6b04a909bcd8152b919920c0
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=form.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.205.98:443 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0016_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 16 at offset 0x1252 53 bytes
SHA-256: eff4a0943aaff2d99cb5c8666337775c91d4d5f687782df94d2c5fc77becde7f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "form", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off000005b1.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x5B1 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off0000130d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x130D 13900 bytes
SHA-256: ac6efb60566e49cb2cc918348e471fe3f01c12322c4aa7ec58d84bf608cab323

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