Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d52b490dd9650f7d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.4 KB Created: 2020-07-10 19:00:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: 28b3aef3289cb85d481edc3831aa16cf SHA-1: cabffe0b15941881fbaa0eddbdbf618fbf41d676 SHA-256: d52b490dd9650f7d5ee6ff8362650a058d807cb469eade79049f020c839731c7
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to suspicious domains and are flagged as malicious redirectors. The document body also contains similar URLs, suggesting a link farm or phishing lure. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness. No scripts were extracted, but the primary attack vector appears to be social engineering via malicious links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=cameroon%20hymnal%20book%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.savebozeman.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408529/80336d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.kcpanhel.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815961/1055807.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.hdb-door.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969545/zavedaxijebipedibizo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thegirlgut.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302987/9775575.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.bbsimon.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682570/tudijimavu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.balochitvonline.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969306/331447.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.dtraveladvisors.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741375/vuzumeroz-madaxovag-nakeku-xonulogibibo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.atdesignpartners.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381612/divutirazovurik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.danerestorativejustice.org/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637239/ea114773d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://talujudi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/81216798762.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vatudig.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/genizuzojupekefagiguwipu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lojemaj.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vuzodunufuvojediz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/vawis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/vinufew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/8976/5279/files/rixedezememepologavub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gigogew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/xanixiki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000607c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x607C 5092 bytes
SHA-256: d2b6a0c977fdf44e86ace5f497e7ff6cdd49a35ab3357737f64d1e33c07c6fee
font_01_sfnt_off00007194.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7194 12336 bytes
SHA-256: a2a9e48157a03ff84c3e1242775382ed4f6e087bebc7ef86f487674c531c2b2d

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