Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63d7cb1f3cea582d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

64.1 KB Created: 2020-07-09 16:08:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 67b745ca41c638fe5e4887a0d8b1bd1f SHA-1: 196d68c92a786a277788b92c03193bf1ed8a7ddf SHA-256: 63d7cb1f3cea582dc0d27fcd20a0ad0069cf294eace1f55a2bc489e7e441a2ca
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document contains numerous links to external PDF files, many of which are hosted on suspicious domains and appear to be part of a link farm. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure at 'https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=minsk%20agreement%20pdf'. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and the presence of urgency lures further supports a malicious intent. The document likely serves as a lure to redirect users to malicious content or download further payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=minsk%20agreement%20pdf
    • http://files.hornsbyptsa.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379434/bomujakurufilo.pdf
    • http://files.lafayetteschoolrestoration.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398357/nutuva.pdf
    • http://files.rabbitmountainlavender.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738625/futevukumuj_lulamatix_libujuferebetux.pdf
    • http://files.flindersroom4u.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857071/37bce30db9.pdf
    • http://files.gardereinitiative.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775856/8794139.pdf
    • http://files.spotlightseniorservicesnorthernarizona.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813409/b5d2688cbaae7c.pdf
    • http://files.almeria-estates-and-realty.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437351/fefozo.pdf
    • http://files.gsskids.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873973/korunavo.pdf
    • http://files.savebozeman.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408529/80336d.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://naxuxeva.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/jisifife.pdf
    • https://banisozix.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/zugogum.pdf
    • https://masinufonowo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/xeporelolop.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/fupibi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/nakawefefaf.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gowavofopinesifaremoka.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/mefiwi.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bf9a.bin
66840fa53b7a4c775e20c138fea1e762e4f649b424ac21a96e9502866bbac4df		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBF9A 5076 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d0c0.bin
3b675327fbf7e3841058900e08135e9fd7eb0b36a2439c2ca0c6980efdf9a610		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD0C0 10240 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.