Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 d4f419e7321760cd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.9 KB Created: 2020-07-08 13:12:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-04
MD5: 147a8205ba97d560f77a918423c9b6c7 SHA-1: ee3bcc9ddd445846ba75475a9496f62c402bea80 SHA-256: d4f419e7321760cd6299a97505bd35e9bd44ce5850f7d949dd3095a515733641
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to domains associated with link farms and redirectors. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness. The primary attack pattern involves redirecting users to potentially malicious content via a link farm, possibly for SEO poisoning or to serve further malicious payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=taconic%20orogeny%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.lockmangenetics.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775383/nizejab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lisamccafferty.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383664/bamibitamurata.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.dftly.org/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070112/4374112.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.kinobykimie.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454850/dizerovamud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.strategicshift.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453007/353331.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.connoisseurstours.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857071/abaa266e7dc9a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.familylawyerminnesota.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607712/jubigi_vomikewupinoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.restauranthibiscus.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776841/5106130.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.westmorelandks.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815752/zigidoveriv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.vargislab.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437445/livenoxu_dagaxowila_redejod_fujiti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.eugenemontgomery.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438766/zesolabugilobe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://vawofomije194917598.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/99181566631.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jelonidamu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/jizutiziv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gidejavamu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/lavefujepizobufami.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zaguzewurufo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/40383199232.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sotetusuveti.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/84708283349.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jevogoxojad.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/11510355699.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://negogumexono156863342.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/19105643342.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b07.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B07 4872 bytes
SHA-256: 0e313dcf39149caea13b756db00b9e37259621fb31c3fdff99e0368971a90029
font_01_sfnt_off00007b9c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B9C 10296 bytes
SHA-256: 76f1043198f9e0ed2a3439e38bd9c982fd6db907603b6bff6a3a776fe6e5923a

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