Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7cfd0302edc0d361…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.8 KB Created: 2020-07-08 16:46:38 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 91ed6c9ab03961fa07c35aae30f2f260 SHA-1: 24803f5ee06657608784b015f1aafeb66d491194 SHA-256: 7cfd0302edc0d361474292a908fe14dcb631db9d394b20ec9abf3ac873c70bb9
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable domains and a redirector, indicating a link farm designed for SEO manipulation or to distribute further malicious content. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and the presence of a redirector URL suggests an attempt to lead users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=dbdesigner+tutorial+pdf
    • http://files.vargislab.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437445/livenoxu_dagaxowila_redejod_fujiti.pdf
    • http://files.trebor-ts.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871690/4fa93.pdf
    • http://files.vk3sn.net/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871894/d40f274a4b81b4.pdf
    • http://files.indigometalworks.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814239/salikikuzifis.pdf
    • http://files.electaylin.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740320/8322645.pdf
    • http://files.rebeccagrayyoga.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163945/7681821.pdf
    • http://files.briangnyp.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814239/wogatekofejalog.pdf
    • http://files.msportsix.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438819/7202190.pdf
    • http://files.aahardware2165.com.au/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438819/9573605.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://gazufinofi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/lunisukatemilajol.pdf
    • https://zugomesemuz.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/pisoripikojenevuv.pdf
    • https://fopumetuleg.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/90508014860.pdf
    • https://sudulinu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/jukezotivijozofez.pdf
    • https://lipuwap.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/28171013805.pdf
    • https://xanojebukeki525275366.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/lezasomowusoreniw.pdf
    • https://laxosuval.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/11452909884.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/sobobubujuwin.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/78476378890.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/84005007378.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/dusegu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/98223768302.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/liwisubusamepumiv.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005cf8.bin
094d1e7c850637e9abb6ccf4e45eb6133904aa35d6c5e32a9ffe1662ee07aa9a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5CF8 5232 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006ec7.bin
f00740a8e499412f53f5bc308c1689fb9e9785343ea440d50449e50410ca0bcf
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6EC7 10292 bytes