Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c11e5f517a08e713…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

72.1 KB First seen: 2023-06-21
MD5: c92fa0bea9d19c390701a9857b4b9e89 SHA-1: e768fa5cfdf7cdbd9e763518461bf561a096dc14 SHA-256: c11e5f517a08e7139694fb3e384f03e3586936ac9e412999f1760af6ffcfc89f
220 Risk Score

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005bc9.bin
9a01b0289a3ce4f303e05d13773d896b12b82c7a545b47128c61415836918e40
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5BC9 3655 bytes