Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bc9e632d4c1c9ed1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

287.8 KB Created: 2004-08-17 12:05:39 -07:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 5.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 1b3761379d5db62deaec474d04ab5cb9 SHA-1: 20c4c62dafac446f0d527bcefce17415679fe5ca SHA-256: bc9e632d4c1c9ed15b9a51811084f7451a793911c6b997e4f23853bb1155fa5f
496 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command then appears to execute the embedded file 'limiting.pdf', which is actually a Windows executable. The embedded executable is likely a second-stage payload, and the overall intent is to deliver and execute malware via a malicious PDF attachment.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\limiting.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://infopeople.org In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off0001ada2.icc)
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS��In extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off0000a6d8.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.comIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off0000a6d8.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.com/repository/verisignlogo.gif0��In extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off0000a6d8.bin)
    • https://www.verisign.com/CPS0bIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off0000a6d8.bin)
    • http://www.microsoft.com/truetype/0In extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off0000a6d8.bin)

Extracted artifacts 13

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
limiting.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 69 at offset 0x2E0AA 388608 bytes
SHA-256: c8e419248e33efa206c3f66595118d876c36b6fe27c379174d46c770d1d198ab
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=limiting.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): CmdBatNotification
javascript_obj0070_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 70 at offset 0x47ABE 57 bytes
SHA-256: b0cd6ebec2108c8e3d208fe99e633848cd91f313c013ae18f2b0adb806dfc3be
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "limiting", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off0001ada2.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x1ADA2 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off00003993.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3993 47532 bytes
SHA-256: 0e2e118bf6b13f8c69ede23486af6f76362ee2a59e1ee1eeddf6c34c073b1488
font_01_sfnt_off0000a6d8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA6D8 22304 bytes
SHA-256: 67ec97295032ce91878f8153bc62e4d7ee04238b5655a41fd8a4474c16a7243d
font_02_sfnt_off0000df99.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF99 33476 bytes
SHA-256: 0a81bfd837b734c8a67dfd679c88a3b2da3834ebe163d6f9a19a001b0c38a305
font_03_sfnt_off00012292.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12292 58140 bytes
SHA-256: 651a624dacfe6a35a784ad1acffd19a471b483c08b16226d21f0551ff135bf3b
font_04_sfnt_off0001b85a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B85A 18316 bytes
SHA-256: d122fc17724f884b97d55b0f31d795107478954e395dbbe860f98646fdf99b34
font_05_sfnt_off0001e44c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1E44C 19604 bytes
SHA-256: f96e074a7732cb4a82ebd796efcf35668e84249e60b6c2c83571a4c3df507a3c
font_06_sfnt_off00020e19.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x20E19 19216 bytes
SHA-256: d876b898138f196bd46b88b510012fc9cf0f8b3618db220d8a50137f003e0bc4
font_07_sfnt_off000237fb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x237FB 18832 bytes
SHA-256: 347e6ebeed90cd31cd21935097d3033617cf1e750f4cb72886776f97748d0997
font_08_sfnt_off0002657e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2657E 10232 bytes
SHA-256: 2fe0cdee7ff7fa3def9d1e52a85b5841f0793e1f34365bb95bea558d4affa8bb
font_09_sfnt_off000294fd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x294FD 33904 bytes
SHA-256: f0db46c42d1f01fbd11f1316e6bcdfd611f7c9c853a341231eefb272f11e30f8