Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 263799d7b6e6af94…

MALICIOUS

PDF

745.1 KB Created: 2004-08-17 12:05:39 -07:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 5.0 (Windows))
MD5: dd2a6197e16d867cbf39d112a3c79e15 SHA-1: ac940a41ee0a53abce27e7766b3b8787aae45ee8 SHA-256: 263799d7b6e6af9410efe0b265434b07284b13b82f59ea74015f9d37fe6f5d7c
456 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a launch action that triggers cmd.exe. The command executed by cmd.exe is designed to run a dropped Windows executable, which is disguised as 'limiting.pdf'. This executable is the primary payload. The combination of PDF launch actions, embedded executables, and command execution strongly indicates a malicious dropper.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9986

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\limiting.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
limiting.pdf
37f6be8afad05aaa06b0df1a75bf7778d26deae4d411db79c753f517105faeb2		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 69 at offset 0x2E0AA 591529 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.95, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
javascript_obj0070_000.js
b0cd6ebec2108c8e3d208fe99e633848cd91f313c013ae18f2b0adb806dfc3be		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 70 at offset 0xBA031 57 bytes
icc_00_off0001ada2.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x1ADA2 3144 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off000237fb.bin
347e6ebeed90cd31cd21935097d3033617cf1e750f4cb72886776f97748d0997		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x237FB 18832 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000294fd.bin
f0db46c42d1f01fbd11f1316e6bcdfd611f7c9c853a341231eefb272f11e30f8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x294FD 33904 bytes

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