Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bad54128dd7b2fa0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.7 KB Created: 2020-07-09 00:13:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: 3329c22e391775170aa4b69d09ae2795 SHA-1: 832ee27d5762e1e1b433aee50ffbe17f1ec4e554 SHA-256: bad54128dd7b2fa0aac260590269c8b0575c7777a102d8d43a16978a7679c7dd
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to domains associated with link farms and redirectors, indicating a phishing or malicious redirection attempt. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of this PDF. The primary attack pattern involves luring users to external sites via these links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=manager%20leadership%20styles%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.jaml.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814423/lolutinovetu-bokedebilakix-pemajaponidosa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.crosstowncharityweek.org/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710782/7e6db4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.cellularmaterials.net/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969154/wosadejufikapiz-zijadepasofodot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.theorchidroom.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776370/bikeximezipajufawovi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.seetheworld.tours/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815961/bawifutopite.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mnnicebaseball.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813851/weteregu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.lemonteilrevolution.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069812/kujuxorox_jisomonibetalu_dorokajuja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://wilewivim.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/votomabatozepow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vikukixiv.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/mivatewimobi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pobesamob.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/penuxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lapujigop.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/viwopena.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xusurubisi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/3392812231.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/74535711799.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/7082322425.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/37237973095.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/44411244229.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/rosetotirumeza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000086bc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x86BC 5088 bytes
SHA-256: 5591a147f685af91b88e09fe88ad16c0e77f6c830c9801575f28531868ac6891
font_01_sfnt_off000097fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x97FE 10088 bytes
SHA-256: 537cd0405598fa9c4e8456532a07bae5c8bf073d4a6978ac6bf23dc6456eafa9

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