Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d10dcee0a54451d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.2 KB Created: 2020-07-09 11:01:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 66eb42fc382eaf04ad83280380782bf5 SHA-1: fc65f6c6e96da6773596976e13ee5a27652d5c9c SHA-256: 0d10dcee0a54451d87bdf4ab4a236651f8622b351679a14f8366b0a6997fa9f3
254 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document exhibits characteristics of a link farm, containing a large number of external PDF links, many of which are algorithmically generated. One of the links points to a known malicious redirector, suggesting a potential distribution mechanism for further malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature, likely acting as a dropper.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-8978364-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-8978364-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=complete+and+incomplete+metamorphosis+worksheet
    • http://files.nanolab.info/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379749/befuraxigufero.pdf
    • http://files.melindahetzel.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454501/9985597.pdf
    • http://files.delawaremusic.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437778/502d98e3f9fa38d.pdf
    • http://files.mytulips.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738507/pumik-zivonirexavo.pdf
    • http://files.inthisuniversebeyondphotography.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407102/noduni_vozili_xelilozab_laxom.pdf
    • http://files.voxcivitas.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409557/277562.pdf
    • http://files.polarclad.com.au/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453496/nitoxerak-zofame-woputakowi.pdf
    • http://files.rcdavis-tellinstories.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383624/ebc2656e5828c5.pdf
    • http://files.seetheworld.tours/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815961/bawifutopite.pdf
    • http://files.fiddlestickcrafts.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740127/nokiwewuvexuru.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://rogofuxeviso.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/fisapip.pdf
    • https://wobuzitij.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dazozanifitopike.pdf
    • https://dowulito.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/67079228862.pdf
    • https://manabip.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/23786297318.pdf
    • https://tezozila.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/79572518606.pdf
    • https://jowifigubug.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tuzafikidepax.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/20659662050.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/78108387577.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/87960197539.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/fupibi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/96626323422.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005ca3.bin
9ba93fba58f2c6b0599419f08897663801a9762075a557c94d1c71dda0385484		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5CA3 5280 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006e6b.bin
46b6ead011ad07ce82c72e524c168d3a86bc58bfbb99fdc0a00efccdda3052f9		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E6B 9620 bytes

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