MALICIOUS
240
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-8570 via a composite moniker. This exploit is known to drop a script file (SCT) which is then executed, leading to further malicious activity. The presence of the 'Please click Enable Editing to view the document.' lure further supports the malicious intent.
Heuristics 7
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Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE_2017_8570RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
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Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATEDRTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
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Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINKRTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
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\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATERTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
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OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATARTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
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Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMBRTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
objdata_00_off00000bac.bind244ad1730adaf249069cb09a3c0ee8f07e03721a721c8581637812770ae43b4 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAC | 221093 bytes |
objdata_01_off0000735b.bin0ecba21df7170c5309069214d0ec066b76f9d1149683988ac34b0d20880a4c94 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x735B | 221066 bytes |
objdata_02_off00077824.bin51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x77824 | 2632 bytes |
objdata_03_off00078dc7.bine8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7 |
rtf-objdata-decoded | RTF \objdata at offset 0x78DC7 | 12297 bytes |
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