Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 649349a7024fc9a2…

MALICIOUS

RTF

662.4 KB First seen: 2026-05-24
MD5: 9b671374dd10b3d12e87f1f909819a60 SHA-1: ae3b49345b9e081ec073e985542f8a9bf7c4419c SHA-256: 649349a7024fc9a257a6a2a882e7018d25c917d9c65100c9494a1cb0adb6954b
340 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically related to CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-0199/CVE-2017-8759, which are used to automatically download and execute a second-stage payload. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'click Enable Editing', a common lure to bypass security measures and facilitate the execution of embedded malicious content. The embedded OLE objects and objdata sections are the likely carriers of the exploit and payload.

Heuristics 9

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 51ef705eef 49 samples

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 221109 bytes
SHA-256: 5146aaa8cad70fde81c7428bf76dc758fe7b4845c50d99e5aa29a3b613c84e95
objdata_01_off00007114.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114 221082 bytes
SHA-256: 0dd2e25608646e37504cddd2e0b2c7c46b322409486edb689b78dca68989ab1b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_02_off000775ff.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x775FF 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645
objdata_03_off00078ba2.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x78BA2 12297 bytes
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7