PDF malware analysis — malicious · a437bd3ff5ec9570

MALICIOUS

PDF

294.7 KB Created: 2011-09-20 10:38:42 +08:00

MD5: 83dd5ce552357d66cd929c84ec611234 SHA-1: eeaaac9765c35a38bb0bafc2ac275c94d4126881 SHA-256: a437bd3ff5ec95700452319a8e8b1c0027508e1132ef11e26235f8de052d800a

136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The PDF file exhibits multiple indicators of malicious activity, including embedded files, JavaScript, and RichMedia (Flash) content, suggesting an exploit attempt. The 'POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE' heuristic indicates a secondary embedded PDF with suspicious findings. While no specific document body text is available for content analysis, the presence of these elements strongly suggests the PDF is designed to exploit vulnerabilities and deliver a malicious payload. The benign URLs extracted do not detract from the malicious indicators.

Heuristics 9

Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA

PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic (matched inside decoded stream)
Encrypted PDF (string and stream contents are opaque to static scan) info PDF_ENCRYPTED

PDF declares /Encrypt — string objects and stream contents are encrypted with the standard security handler (RC4 or AES). On its own this is informational; legitimate encrypted documents include signed contracts, billing statements, and rights-managed material. Static heuristics cannot inspect encrypted payload bytes.
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 13

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0001.bin` `3000b3469a8bd553f177da3f507a5ea2271a3dee1fd5d5343f41950837af583c`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 1 at offset 0x3B36	163 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0002.bin` `66b82b096ae83103365f40b9b767a5582b0a497e4589e7b9323eac0320c61808`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 2 at offset 0x3C27	1670 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0003.bin` `e763ac63c3d21786709e7f462b463575525d0e344202f42dbb96897a01541e78`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 3 at offset 0x3F43	785 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0004.bin` `720c47f19e6a058099295d18a16b7149cc73fe497eb78821ea810f3192228dc4`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x4138	150 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0005.bin` `c8a82f67dfd8d68c2f8fe494ca2deee4604701c8f02863bf87d222b992e45de9`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 5 at offset 0x4209	2955 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0006.bin` `4cb349134bdb5f1a1c03281df9b53128ebe947f235398a912a4f0a9f638b24d5`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 6 at offset 0x4583	200 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0007.bin` `4273cd319df227c91b92e5509527bb4f6e1abfb3aa2beec2fb2adb93a8671f62`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 7 at offset 0x4676	835 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0008.bin` `4a60a9864cdf7382475d51051a03fdc43b32c31eb508893ccfccece34957f9f1`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x484D	56 bytes
`stream_002_off000003ed.js` `529357503ec67b623d2a12816cdeea62bd639f2b4ff4e568b01c96cc3f5bfc6f`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3ED	1363 bytes
`stream_003_off000005ca.js` `e985b5df65c8c3cf732a9074b575fbc594c1c7f0bccc0994182ec7e5c0f7308a`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5CA	902 bytes
`objstm_0047_00.bin` `856830b101f28eaa61f2ccb44204fecaa2d0a9658055009fda363a9d3056ff76`	pdf-objstm-decoded	PDF /ObjStm 47 0 obj (inflated)	2543 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off0000f48b.pdf` `366dd783226a7b7343e9927af00643a697569690e6013ccb5ea3170cf4cd28e3`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xF48B	239199 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off000482fb.pdf` `9a95102ad6b4d58a9a742832f61490a27e9b62855fe295b13214addfda321ad3`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x482FB	6127 bytes

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