Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7412a03300c5471d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

343.9 KB Created: 2011-06-30 15:13:40 +08:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 3.0)
MD5: b74be46373b56fb7ef23705bca8e1000 SHA-1: d9401fb79b51bd4884a3fa1a7674f857ee209530 SHA-256: 7412a03300c5471d1c4791f3a8720b4cea6a0a407547d243041d2357a5839e53
366 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded Flash content and JavaScript, triggering critical heuristics for PDF JavaScript exploit clusters and Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploits (CVE-2011-0611). The ML classifier also flagged this PDF as malicious with high confidence. The embedded JavaScript is minimal, but the presence of exploit code suggests the primary goal is to execute a secondary payload, likely downloaded from a URL. The document body is unreadable, but the heuristics indicate it's likely a lure designed to trick the user into interacting with the malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9109

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Flash Player RichMedia exploit critical CVE likely CVE_2011_0611_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation with an embedded AS3 SWF loader (ByteArray/loadBytes) and shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static exploit shape associated with CVE-2011-0611 Flash content delivered through Adobe Reader.
  • Embedded PDF child has suspicious static findings critical PDF_EMBEDDED_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    PDF contains an embedded PDF stream whose extracted child matches suspicious or malicious PDF heuristics. Wrapper PDFs are commonly used to hide the actual exploit or lure payload from scanners that do not recursively inspect attachments.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 37 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.8/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.8/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.7/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/
    • http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/update
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_timesnewroman.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATION

Extracted artifacts 23

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0001.bin
2bbe69c5e9b01e09ead01d39980623115955d79663f86ee38c3e26d62468aede		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 1 at offset 0x380F 163 bytes
embedded_file_obj0002.bin
2db2fcfa6c7f0b58af35cd0b7a546eab3e22594fa9e6a322d8448248c1371742		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 2 at offset 0x38FF 1683 bytes
embedded_file_obj0003.bin
6824595d40fe37ff3a17665623abb424df29f2bf3924106e83b1192a2fc6fa0d		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 3 at offset 0x3C21 784 bytes
embedded_file_obj0004.bin
720c47f19e6a058099295d18a16b7149cc73fe497eb78821ea810f3192228dc4		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x3E15 150 bytes
embedded_file_obj0005.bin
c8a82f67dfd8d68c2f8fe494ca2deee4604701c8f02863bf87d222b992e45de9		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 5 at offset 0x3EE6 2955 bytes
embedded_file_obj0006.bin
4cb349134bdb5f1a1c03281df9b53128ebe947f235398a912a4f0a9f638b24d5		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 6 at offset 0x4260 200 bytes
embedded_file_obj0007.bin
41b90835819d2fc9adfbed1f624b97daf557be436627d29ad24fdfcbedc74198		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 7 at offset 0x4353 835 bytes
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
4a60a9864cdf7382475d51051a03fdc43b32c31eb508893ccfccece34957f9f1		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x452B 56 bytes
embedded_file_obj0072.bin
676abdf89259991bbde6a57a2423c629870a437bc477a903574eba3570861622		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 72 at offset 0x7E20 162 bytes
embedded_file_obj0073.bin
b646c863068dd809ba1fe5481aecb499465f1bd3a044f7733fe3d3935e312efb		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 73 at offset 0x7F10 96 bytes
javascript_obj0075_000.js
b4c77449deb96f0bd59c15743f54f9192b3b7e5a2f49d6a129eb783aa7e7d78f		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 75 at offset 0x7FF5 44 bytes
stream_002_off000003d6.js
529357503ec67b623d2a12816cdeea62bd639f2b4ff4e568b01c96cc3f5bfc6f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3D6 1363 bytes
stream_003_off000005b3.js
e985b5df65c8c3cf732a9074b575fbc594c1c7f0bccc0994182ec7e5c0f7308a		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5B3 902 bytes
objstm_0041_00.bin
cc0d110077f81314ac59a491675430d25faa86bdc2526ed35971cf361ac83464		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 41 0 obj (inflated) 1575 bytes
stream_006_off000088d4.js
ded940b77b9a3e0e4eaa9475cad5e9eb88e987a0b7ab9f46cb752799f3aca6c4		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x88D4 38286 bytes
objstm_0016_00.bin
3cbf19b006091b3e421e5c1cd1c8127430c1fddb99de414cc59098dfd09ec272		 pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 16 0 obj (inflated) 967 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00033317.bin
8e07373218a8cecb46c7c5566504c7080ce21bc372ce6f368f14bdb4510a7003		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x33317 20984 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00035afd.bin
0541cde01f28c81f0d9bb6e95d678a1e01068b9a37e3c8fca61e58bd2aa3c0f8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x35AFD 106496 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000447d8.bin
b34a020970be6e4fbf81919a74322ca3be17673735317d3eb44ac1dbf365d36b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x447D8 101444 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00022a21.pdf
b77e993fee155b257f8557009504642db418d645b3e28c1e1c7c2b744787278b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x22A21 210330 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002e93e.pdf
e97c41e2d40cfbfde01c6c7e519f237a38379767a2c34e174db6834c4e4a55ef		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x2E93E 161405 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00052fe1.pdf
8819803854b223925788808ea24ee7a401ca69f44e88d076d044728a12bf3180		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x52FE1 12250 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off000547ce.pdf
0b1c923c8a0028794f3a3244dc498786746334f394e41678cc58ffbeb707d0a8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x547CE 6125 bytes

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