PDF / .TMP malware analysis — malicious · a3fbcd12d0a47e22

MALICIOUS

PDF / .TMP

140.7 KB Created: 2009-11-18 15:12:31 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office Word 2007

MD5: 97ef6b9543038e92ca2a1f6e854c6e61 SHA-1: 5a0dad992d7a8632ed194b3b41359109c79db25f SHA-256: a3fbcd12d0a47e2205e6f76779cc243018951d83f8afc74ad11e857e51a6b9f3

584 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

This PDF file contains a JavaScript dropper and a launch action that executes cmd.exe. The script and launch action are designed to exploit CVE-2010-1240 and potentially CVE-2023-26369 to download and execute a Windows executable payload from the URL http://62.101.232.204/download/youhavebeenhacked.exe. The embedded file is declared as a PDF but is detected as a Windows executable, further indicating malicious intent.

Heuristics 15

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED

PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\C:\Documents and Settings\aa\My Documents\Steria\Sikkerhet\demo\Strategidokument.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK

PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION

PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL

PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://62.101.232.204/download/youhavebeenhacked.exe

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`CDocuments_and_SettingsaaMy_DocumentsSteriaSikkerhetdemoStrategidokument.pdf` `f6de1ee17e94eddfcc5d8f8d2739bb0928f8c68cb53900c3e4accb81d41a9881`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 39 at offset 0x1C3E7	87552 bytes
`javascript_obj0040_000.js` `a2eecdb27cf952d282fc5c216889608336c1764982cf2b01675a4dcfa7146448`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 40 at offset 0x22B0F	122 bytes
`stream_002_off00000dbf.bin` `2b1d0f71bedc315aa55af915886851ddef708395efd535fc44928c8d768a9485`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xDBF	126700 bytes

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