Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 96beff905aa8ec43…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.2 KB Created: 2020-08-17 18:32:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 7a41363149e9d42bdfb8d4a1f04c145b SHA-1: 56f09281264e0e6424157aa5f2a3f9dd6127bb46 SHA-256: 96beff905aa8ec437b9b9fe7c19116432ac983fbdfdcae21a852ecdd700376e1
334 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link T1071.001 Web Protocols

The PDF contains an embedded script payload and links to a known malicious redirector. The document body also contains instructions that lure the user into executing commands via the clipboard, likely involving PowerShell, as indicated by the 'battery report powershell' string. This suggests the PDF is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the provided URL.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 9

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=battery+report+powershell In PDF document text
    • http://files.blackraven6.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739147/b9b27100.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2513/6797/files/behavior_management_plan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7211/7141/files/9283460274.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4089/7181/files/boiler_nptel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5216/3481/files/gijupitejosuviriw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0441/1280/6040/files/66783318166.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7528/8742/files/40403557874.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0446/5029/9555/files/diablo_2_lod_no_cd_torrent.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/0667/3574/files/lg_direct_drive_dishwasher_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1675/7154/files/65864102959.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8832/1435/files/divitasazilulonudorotepas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/8945/9368/files/77671796973.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5162/2306/files/68929833822.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4550/2626/files/43831118866.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7616/5536/files/marine_seismic_data_acquisition.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2513/6797/In macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0000b78a.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0xB78A 1596 bytes
SHA-256: b5323efedf40c68e24ef5f536a0f096b9903c93266b8115d41f44b8a7bb074e4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Smallpdf Desktop'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Kuline Zumirukoli</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Battery report powershell. Battery life has played a significant role in the development of laptops such as laptops and netbook</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Battery report powershell. Battery life has played a significant role in the development of laptops such as laptops and netbook</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Battery report powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Smallpdf Desktop'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-02-20T16:00:04'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Smallpdf Desktop'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='a07dc581-0fa9-492a-9cf4-9276ab9c0911'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='37b8297f-ead2-416b-ac9e-3965b0322bae'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off000063e6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x63E6 5152 bytes
SHA-256: 97caa53d47adef402755874f8d7e19ef8b0b14ba73918edb149ee105c15b6f36
font_01_sfnt_off00007578.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7578 10712 bytes
SHA-256: 4155138f80d5830279418e39c74b97c42757f9327a31358a2d7734fbeb1f2477
font_02_sfnt_off00009a1d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9A1D 16312 bytes
SHA-256: aad9bc0f36eadc3314e08670b59090120051e308b357201f134af3d0b781b2b0

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