Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0189180c29e888ca…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.3 KB Created: 2020-09-01 03:55:36 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: f37a7ca3c951d7f8143cdedef9ec08e1 SHA-1: 7b7fb37021fbb047b33890e97036136803e55944 SHA-256: 0189180c29e888ca84ce8e2a352c9cf818be0464a658369822bc10f5e171e077
334 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains an embedded script and lures the user with text that explicitly mentions 'powershell' and instructs them to copy/paste commands. It links to a redirector URL which likely serves as a distribution point for further malicious content. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 9

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=get-+date+adddays+format+powershell In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6581/8789/files/26108788928.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5380/0859/files/degamemakapuz.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9197/5580/files/barusorugavadef.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6581/8790/files/automotive_maintenance_and_light_repair.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/2476/1510/files/manual_capture_one_12_espaol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2826/6654/files/chess_analyse_this_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4560/0931/files/mivitiluguxazusagizuwavir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/7c3584_81a1342b04e3408d93b398b87a31970f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9c43ec_ccb4f6fd3071432083fc6cc9e04be34a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/7652/3934/files/jabad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2966/6724/files/69608086396.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/7141/3151/files/31922496410.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/3173/2132/files/37873863366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0462/0831/9641/files/lazasaninuvanaxakoxeloz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6581/8789/In macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0000a7e5.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0xA7E5 1618 bytes
SHA-256: 25efd9cbcb3270567c3af57ff96310b9aac5823fbbe19e99e654aee99392f154
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='LibreOffice Draw'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Wemugifa Bivurulu</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Get- date adddays format powershell. This would be because you gave  date line value in yyyyMMdd format. You want to create a  with G</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Get- date adddays format powershell. This would be because you gave  date line value in yyyyMMdd format. You want to create a  with G</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Get- date adddays format powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='LibreOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-04-11T04:36:28'
  xmp:CreatorTool='LibreOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='93f112d7-77b4-47ac-9737-11df78f47bfd'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='07f7cb5f-8254-4aca-a220-9d59a94a55ef'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off00005cbb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5CBB 3016 bytes
SHA-256: cbb52481ce94e16f1aa7c1e5556943e0858c32639ae52c58d7d3596933ba349e
font_01_sfnt_off00006777.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6777 5540 bytes
SHA-256: f77a88110aa6032687fafd72e2d73d01a4754ccba58dbb38c6225bd1834fd504
font_02_sfnt_off00007a44.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7A44 11136 bytes
SHA-256: 97bb7fe50dc7a9cd85bf9c38c5a8002846c18fb071e90bbaf5c0d3b9e38855a6

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