Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 95170f591541829b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

248.0 KB Created: 2015-10-01 14:27:01 -07:00 Authoring application: RAD PDF (via RAD PDF 2.37.1.0 - http://www.radpdf.com) First seen: 2026-05-04
MD5: 440f2410abdacd3c2b661905f718c5e3 SHA-1: 9fe7519cf039e8b909faebba4919b30e8c7e021f SHA-256: 95170f591541829b0610435869e3d3bbe436cb784fffffc50df3f452070a184a
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

This PDF is identified as an image-based lure, designed to trick users into clicking on embedded links. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The document body contains multiple URLs, including a shortened link via ow.ly, which likely redirect to phishing pages or malware distribution sites. The primary malicious URL identified is http://ettiisallatt.bugs3.com/adobe/adobe/adobe.htm.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9764

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7284072-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7284072-0
  • Image-only PDF lure links through URL shortener high PDF_IMAGE_LURE_SHORTENER_LINK
    PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its clickable action points to a URL shortener. This is a high-confidence credential-phishing carrier shape: the visible page is a screenshot-like prompt while the destination is hidden behind redirect infrastructure.
  • Image-only PDF lure links to a brand-impersonating path on an unrelated host high PDF_IMAGE_LURE_BRAND_PATH_LINK
    PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its clickable action targets a URL carrying a brand name ('adobe') as a path segment on a host that does not belong to that brand and is not known-good (e.g. 'sodecoperu.com/Docusign/index.php'). This is the credential-phishing carrier shape where a compromised or unrelated host serves a brand-named phishing kit behind a screenshot-like lure page. Distinct from the typosquat-host rule: here the host is honest-looking but the brand lives in the path.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 1 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 248 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ettiisallatt.bugs3.com/adobe/adobe/adobe.htm PDF link annotation
    • http://www.old.galleystudio.com/cenel/sere/adobe/adobe.htmIn PDF document text
    • http://www.cactuserp.gr/prevent/LoginIn PDF document text
    • http://nimconconsult.com/gregglibaba/Login%20pdf.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://goprea.org/bin/admin/Googledocsaved/pdf_document/pdf_document/pdf.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.radpdf.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.radpdf.com)/Author(Seed)/Creator(RADIn PDF document text
    • http://www.dynaforms.comIn PDF document text
    • http://ow.ly/Zp85ZIn PDF document text
    • http://bit.ly/2aqaN5iIn PDF document text
    • http://e-elmorsy.myjino.ru/make/am/SignIn PDF document text
    • http://afrahsonn12.myjino.ru/BestPdf/index.phpIn PDF document text
    • http://j732031.myjino.ru/PP/index.phpIn PDF document text
    • http://j732031.myjino.ru/zee/PP/index.phpIn PDF document text
    • http://tzrnedical-daisy.myjino.ru/PP/index.phpIn PDF document text
    • http://tzrnedical-daisy.myjino.ru/sos/PP/index.phpIn PDF document text
    • http://tzrnedical-daisy.myjino.ru/dfd/PP/index.phpIn PDF document text
    • http://j732089.myjino.ru/adobe/secure_pdf.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000016ea.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16EA 169476 bytes
SHA-256: a6eacb5f4c318f191f5c7ef56b8a9d24965db43dd12e86dc8eafc984e1163d47
font_01_sfnt_off000146b2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x146B2 39788 bytes
SHA-256: 71f04eb0a43e49cb119288ed8821d0c62f8ea4e454b9af74768f689464c0e526

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