Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 dffc2ee3a0061461…

MALICIOUS

PDF

246.6 KB Created: 2015-10-01 14:27:01 -07:00 Authoring application: PDFescape Online - https://www.pdfescape.com (via RAD PDF 3.19.2.2 - https://www.radpdf.com) First seen: 2026-06-04
MD5: ef6a6b696fbb623c63f8c4efdb825230 SHA-1: 9e002c7c925d090e3c1c39be30a0242db6469e49 SHA-256: dffc2ee3a00614617004f1fa856861c450087f7ce5b357c2c4773bf42a65f9b7
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF is identified as an image-based lure, typical of phishing attacks, where a screenshot is used to hide a clickable link. The document body contains multiple URLs pointing to login or invoice-related pages, suggesting a credential harvesting attempt. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and heuristic firings strongly indicate a phishing lure designed to redirect users to malicious websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9799

Heuristics 4

  • Image-only PDF lure links to a brand-impersonating path on an unrelated host high PDF_IMAGE_LURE_BRAND_PATH_LINK
    PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its clickable action targets a URL carrying a brand name ('outlook') as a path segment on a host that does not belong to that brand and is not known-good (e.g. 'sodecoperu.com/Docusign/index.php'). This is the credential-phishing carrier shape where a compromised or unrelated host serves a brand-named phishing kit behind a screenshot-like lure page. Distinct from the typosquat-host rule: here the host is honest-looking but the brand lives in the path.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 1 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 246 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://home-tech.com.ar/invoice/weblogin.html In PDF document text
    • http://home-tech.com.ar/invoice_document/weblogin.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://palauconsulsandiego.com/wp-includes/wp-content/weblogin.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://inetradar.com/outlook/Payment%20Slip/Payment%20Slip.htmIn PDF document text
    • http://formare.usarb.md//wp-includes/old/PDF/In PDF document text
    • http://facilitytip.com/-./PDF1/PDF/In PDF document text
    • https://www.radpdf.comIn PDF document text
    • https://www.radpdf.com)/Creator(PDFescapeIn PDF document text
    • https://www.pdfescape.com)/Author(Seed)/RadPdfCustomData(pdfescape.com-open-4C74399BC8C12FAEDFDD48FE12CA6D1AD2DBA208C54400A7)/CreationDate(D:20151001142701-07In PDF document text
    • http://www.dynaforms.comIn PDF document text
    • http://lauer.myjino.ru/bush/login.htmPDF link annotation
    • http://purchasetrade.myjino.ru/new%20PO/index.htmIn PDF document text
    • http://a0565463.xsph.ru/p/PDF1/PDF/In PDF document text
    • https://www.pdfescape.comIn PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HIn PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0In PDF document text
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00001124.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1124 169476 bytes
SHA-256: a6eacb5f4c318f191f5c7ef56b8a9d24965db43dd12e86dc8eafc984e1163d47
font_01_sfnt_off000140ec.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x140EC 39788 bytes
SHA-256: 71f04eb0a43e49cb119288ed8821d0c62f8ea4e454b9af74768f689464c0e526

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