Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9493927d62c3cb39…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.4 KB Created: 2020-09-30 20:36:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-04-11
MD5: 0a7c9685b29668db58f5177d72dab6f6 SHA-1: b736e0c7022e75daea4bb4bbef4d0b97a362fac8 SHA-256: 9493927d62c3cb395a59fe87433a9f7ae436a54b8764d3dbe1dc95452a749231
214 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Document signing service impersonation lure medium SE_DOCUSIGN_LURE
    Document impersonates DocuSign, Adobe Sign, or a similar signing service in a signing-request context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=assinatura+digital+em+pdf+gratis In PDF document text
    • https://site-1036711.mozfiles.com/files/1036711/rifulatenogoko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037207.mozfiles.com/files/1037207/41115180944.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036911.mozfiles.com/files/1036911/janefifurutamimurafu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037821.mozfiles.com/files/1037821/pufuwirazuwunopesojebev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036935.mozfiles.com/files/1036935/duremedelavabo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036722.mozfiles.com/files/1036722/2998526841.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036962.mozfiles.com/files/1036962/nevapixarame.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006039.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006039.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0467/5511/9267/files/95152923544.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9151/6839/files/call_of_duty_black_ops_apk_mod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0477/9822/3015/files/rutag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4172/6370/files/fexugizadibevepotafagagid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3ce26505-8df9-4428-9d74-157b0fb7cf3f/xigikokekinirapidujubaza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5eb26330-6830-4e87-b440-b96ebe6d4077/9622190113.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/040bb344-4dae-4081-8668-2bdf403164d8/mukerilunuxuvovorutulijar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5f2d315d-6265-4fb9-a9e4-8bd1328c8c6e/zobagaluf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/3191/9765/files/week_1-3_secret_battle_stars_season_8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006039.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006039.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6039 5348 bytes
SHA-256: 1477d9b30d692771670cad837afd5b4bee5e049ce91699cb2b0d0aa0ed70ece1
font_01_sfnt_off00007251.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7251 10144 bytes
SHA-256: a9ec1e2a71df0a8a2417317852a34d6e3803d88263cf9e213c7bf24605b1cb4b