Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 63a6d3917652fafa…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.0 KB Created: 2020-09-01 15:38:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c7d3009012e5ee17ecb6cb8ff72cd20a SHA-1: 2f35ba6f767a4c91ba9a42c4d532e4e0e446cffa SHA-256: 63a6d3917652fafa667c7f485a9ffb3f44013bb17304e4ae53df60f2f28fb79b
174 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links and impersonates a document signing service, a common lure for phishing. The primary link directs to a malicious redirector infrastructure, likely serving as a gateway to a further malicious payload or phishing page. The document body, though heavily corrupted, contains text related to ebook readers and a URL that aligns with the malicious redirector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Document signing service impersonation lure medium SE_DOCUSIGN_LURE
    Document impersonates DocuSign, Adobe Sign, or a similar signing service in a signing-request context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wix?keyword=best+free+ebook+reader+app+for+android
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/7e0eb0_5cd2dd12e080406b85480ce8ed8b437a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ac51ce_b7e9023de91f48baa672c88f4056a7cf.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/430cb2_73ad73d94a7d4506985acfda1eb659ac.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/83e24f_e5ff62acdbf646729d4d983e09798a62.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/83b1b3_22872e34d41349b09871ee139d95b841.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e98895_aee6b2e5cfc148fbb05efcb853cc142c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_9457d1d0d431470e8844057789c5ded9.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c5d40f_99b99097fc6247e591260042370a640e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/4117a9_d918dd3f5aca428089d123b617812fd6.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3328/8088/files/1047035831.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0821/9547/files/calculator_fonts_free.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5698/8311/files/xajabodotanifowojapaxo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3357/5075/files/12953253128.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2914/2426/files/google_sheets_alphabetical_order_ipad.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0459/6246/1344/files/kuwivopexupepebapumelaj.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9243/5359/files/numbers_in_english_1_to_1000_spelling.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b05.bin
378a45bec0007d1da4f49a7e29e5410adeef48e19a19d0f01a1e579828b1fa88		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B05 5044 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007c34.bin
3b00014845c32b61db344639f33e1db4cec2ac641a50668498bc27d6a0acf23e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C34 10684 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a0bb.bin
a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA0BB 4324 bytes

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